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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1.

Did the trial court err in finding the Hallmark "note"

enforceable and a marital debt and charging one-half to the wife?
2.

Did

the

trial

court

err

in

finding

the

vacant

lot

adjacent to the marital residence was not marital property and in
excluding it from the marital estate?
3.

Was it error for the trial court to award only $500 of

the $7,142.50 in attorney's fees and costs to the wife given the
fact that

the uncooperative

behavior

of the husband

caused a

substantial portion of those fees to be incurred?
4.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in the arbitrary

nature of its valuation and division of personal property?
5.

Were the trial proceedings properly conducted so as to

result in a fair trial to the wife?
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ARVILLA FINLAYSON,

:

Plaintiff/Appellant,
Cross-Respondent,
v.
ROGER FINLAYSON,
Defendant/Respondent,
Cross-Petitioner

:
:
:

Case No. 920411-CA

:

District Court 904905062DA

Priority No, 16

:
:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPELLANT'S JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction

of

this

Court

is conferred

provisions of Section 78-2a-3(g) Utah Code Ann,

pursuant

to

the

(1953, as amended)

This action involves the appeal of Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law and a Decree of Divorce signed and entered in the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah
on March 31, 1992.

An Order denying Plaintifffs Motion for New

Trial was signed on May 20, 1992.
filed on July 17, 1992.

A timely Notice of Appeal was

A cross appeal was filed on July 1, 1992.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal involves a divorce case. The parties were married
on September 4, 1964 and separated on or about December 21, 1990.

The parties are parents of four children, only one of which is
under the age of 18.
Finlayson,

filed

defendant,

Mr.

counterclaim.

a

In December, 1991, the plaintiff, Mrs.

Complaint

Finlayson,

for
filed

Divorce.
an

Subsequently

Answer

but

did

the
not

Although the case was assigned to Judge Timothy R.

Hanson, in his absence it was tried before the Honorable John F.
Wahlquist, retired judge. The trial was held on October 17 and 18,
1991.

The parties and other witnesses testified at the trial. At

the conclusion of the trial, Judge Wahlquist ruled from the bench
as to the division of marital property, custody of the parties1
minor

child,

support

attorneyfs fees.

obligations, the

allocation

of

debt

and

Mr. Finlayson prepared proposed Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce and a post trial
hearing was held on Mrs. Fin]aysonfs objections on February 21,
1992.

At the conclusion of that hearing, Judge Wahlquist made

additional

findings

and

clarifications

and

the

supplemental

Findings, Conclusions and Decree were finally entered on March 31,
1992.

On April 3, 1992, Mrs., Finlayson filed a Motion for New

Trial.

Judge Wahlquist issued a written Memorandum Decision on May

19, 1992 and an Order Denying that Motion was signed and entered on
May 20, 1992.
Mrs. Finlayson filed a timely Notice of Appeal on June 17,
1992.

A Notice of Cross Appeal was filed by Mr. Finlayson on July

1, 1992.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant,

Mrs.

Finlayson

seeks

the

following

relief

on

appeal:
1.

An

order

vacating

the

trial

court's

findings

and

conclusion that the "Hallmark" debt Respondent claimed was owed to
his mother was a marital obligation and an order directing the
trial court to modify the property distribution to reflect the
elimination of this debt.
2.

An

order

vacating

the

trial

court's

findings

and

conclusions that the vacant lot next to the marital residence was
the property of Respondent's mother and an order directing that
this property be included as a part of the marital estate.
3.

An order awarding Appellant an additional $2,099.15 in

attorney's

fees

for

fees which were

incurred

by Appellant

in

seeking Respondent's cooperation and compliance with prior court
orders.
4.

In the alternative, an order remanding this matter to the

District Court for a new trial before a different trial judge.
5.
and

costs

An Order awarding Appellant all of her attorney's fees
associated

with

this

appeal

and

the

defense

of

Respondent's cross appeal.
6.

For such other and further relief as may be appropriate.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
MARITAL HISTORY

The parties were married on September 4, 1964, approximately
28 years ago.

They had four children
3

(R-2) .

One died during

childhood, two are adults and one daughter
Trisha,

age

16.

(R-423)

marriage, Mr. Finlayson
shop in a local mall.

Approximately

is still a minor,

one

year

before

the

(Roger) decided to open a Hallmark Card
(R-493)

After the marriage, both parties

devoted all of their efforts to the success of this business until
it was sold in June of 1985. (R-722)
during

the

day

with

Roger

keeping

They both worked at the shop
the

books.

(R-541)

Mrs.

Finlayson (Arvilla) also devoted her full time to the endeavor, as
well as caring for the children (at the shop after school and at
home in the evenings), and keeping a good home for Roger. (R-4 36)
For the first five years, the parties lived in an apartment
owned by Roger's parents and didn f t pay rent.

(R-58 6) Afterwards,

they purchased a home in Salt Lake and relied on the store for
income to pay the day to day family expenses.
the store for $250,000.00.

In 1985 they sold

($50,000.00 down and $6,000.00 per

month on the remaining balance) (R-592, 722) Roger put the down
payment

in

a

local

thrift

and

loan.

(R-591,

593)

Shortly

thereafter that institution failed and to date, the parties have
recouped about 70% of their initial deposit.
parties paid off their home.
of the monthly store payment.

(R-499)

(R-725)

In 1988 the

The parties then lived off

Roger would direct Arvilla to put

$3,000.00 each month in the savings account and keep $3,000.00 in
cash, which was then kept in the safe at the marital residence.
(R-431)

Arvilla did not know very much about the family finances,

leaving that pretty much to Roger.

4

During the marriage, the parties acquired real property, some
investments and substantial personal property including tools and
guns, a doll collection as well as various automobiles, a boat, a
motor home, stock, a cash value in a life insurance policy, and
other miscellaneous items.

(See Exhibit 7-P, Addendum)

The marriage began to deteriorate and in the first part of
1990, Roger moved from the marital bedroom to a separate room in
the home. (R-424)
Arvilla access.

He installed a lock on the door and refused

He also began eating his meals in the room

(R-426) and encouraged

his

16 year old daughter Trisha to do

likewise and to spend all of her time after school in the room with
him.

(R-425)

In March

possible divorce.

1990, the parties

(R-726)

began

discussing

a

In early December 1990, Roger began

removing items such as the coin collection (R-513) from the safe
and personal property from the home.

(R-727, 702)

He testified

he gave all of his tools to his son Kurt in August 1991.
In early December 1990,

(R-710)

Roger also told Arvilla that she

should get a lawyer and proceed with a divorce.

(R-720)

Then,

without advising Arvilla, he withdrew the following monies from the
parties1 savings account and paid this cash to his mother claiming
they were payments on two loans his father had made to him in 1962
and 1964 respectively.
December
December
December
December

11,
12,
13,
14,

(R-695)

1990
1990
1990
1990

$

TOTAL
(See Exhibit 20-D, Addendum)
5

9,300.00
9,000.00
9,500.00
38,985.00
$66,785.00

Upon

learning

of

what

Roger

was

doing,

Arvilla

withdrew

approximately $35,000,00 to prevent further dissipation of marital
assets by Roger.

(R-413)
PRE-TRIAL DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS

On December 20, 1990, Arvilla filed a Complaint for Divorce
(R-2) and secured a restraining order against Roger which among
other things, restrained him from further disposing of assets.
23)

(R-

At the January 11, 1991 Temporary Relief hearing, the parties

were awarded joint legal custody of Trisha, but because Trisha
wished to remain with her father, Roger received physical custody
and

use

of the marital

reasonable visitation.

residence.

(R-56)

Arvilla

received

The home was to be listed for sale with

each party to cooperate to effectuate the earliest possible sale.
(R-63)
(R-77)

Roger then refused to agree on an agent and listing price.
In March of 1991, the parties finally

entered

into a

further stipulation agreeing to use Todd S. Eagar of Eagar and
Company to list and sell the marital residence and the adjacent lot
which the parties owned.
Roger

began

to thwart

mother. (R-77, 38, 452)

visitation

between

Trisha

and

her

In fact, in July of 1991 a mutually agreed

upon custody evaluator concluded that Roger f s actions had been
harmful to Trisha and stated:
It is this evaluatorfs professional opinion that Trisha
Ann Finlayson is in danger of being seriously damaged
emotionally and psychologically in her present living
arrangements.
She has no empathy for her mother f s
position and has been placed in the positions of acting
as her father's surrogate spouse.
She tends to his
illnesses, shared the problems of his divorce and
recreates on weekends with him.
She states that she
6

works hard at school for him. Both admit to having few
friends outside the relationship. (Emphasis added)
Trisha should be encouraged to have regular visits with
her mother and attempt to re-establish that relationship.
(R-116) (Emphasis added)
As of April 30, 1991, Roger had still not listed the home and
lot and had failed to make necessary repairs on the home to ready
it for sale.

(R-77)

Even though ordered to do so in March 1991

(R-71) he would not cooperate in listing the vacant lot until June
1991.

(R-711)
In June of 1991, Arvilla requested a contempt citation against

Roger for his repeated failure to comply with court orders. (R-77)
The

hearing

on

that

request

resulted

in

Commissioner

recommending compliance with the previous orders.

Arnett

An evidentiary

hearing in the contempt issue was to be held before Judge Hanson.
Commissioner Arnett also reserved the issue of Arvilla f s request
for attorney's fees related to Roger's non-compliance.
Arvilla filed a Certificate of Readiness for Trial in June
1991,

(R-86) and the matter was ultimately

tried before Judge

Wahlquist, a retired judge substituting for Judge Hanson on October
17 and 18, 1991.
TRIAL
At trial, Arvilla, Roger, the parties son Kurt and Roger's
mother, Mina Finlayson, testified. Ms. Donovan, Arvilla f s counsel,
testified by stipulated proffer as to Arvilla's fees.

(R-531) Mr.

Russell, Roger's counsel, did not cross examine Ms. Donovan nor did
he testify as to his fees.

(R-533)
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The major issues over which there was substantial dispute
were:
1.

How were two "notes" written by Roger to his parents in
1962

and

1964 respectively

legitimate,

were

these

to be treated?

marital

debts

to

i.e.
be

If

charged

against the marital estate?
2.

Was

a vacant

lot next to the marital

residence

and

transferred to the parties in 1978 with Roger as trustee
and Roger's mother as settlor, marital property or was it
still property of Roger's mother?
3.

How

was

the

substantial

personal

property,

acquired

during the marriage, to be valued and distributed?
4.

How was Arvilla to be assured of meaningful access and
visitation to Trisha?

5.

What amount of fees should Roger pay Arvilla because of
his repeated failures to obey court orders?
"Hallmark and Rent Notes"

In 1962, two years before the parties married, Roger claimed
his father had loaned him $14,000.00 to start the Hallmark card
shop.

He said he prepared and signed a "note"

Addendum) and gave it to his father.
principal

amount

nor a due

date.

(Exhibit 18-D,

The "note" did not contain a
It provided

only

that

the

unspecified amount advanced would bear interest at 6% per annum.
Roger's mother was not present or involved in the transaction.
538) Roger gave the document to his father (R-699) .

(R-

His father

died in 1969 and it was just before this divorce began that Roger
8

secured possession of the "note" from his mother (R-582).
he'd

forgotten about it.

Roger's

calculations

(R-587)

Attached to the note were

as to the total

interest due through trial.

He said

amount

of principal

i.e. $71,672.13 (R-585).

and

Roger did

not introduce any documents reflecting the initial claimed loan (R696)
Both

Roger

and

his

mother

acknowledged

Arvilla

had

knowledge as to the financial details of the loan (R-541, 698)
in fact, they didn't want her involved.

(R-558)

no
and

Arvilla said she

knew Roger had received some money from his father but didn't know
much else.

(R-444, 525)

She recalled Roger's parents having a

history of making gifts to their two sons.

(R-484, 522)

During the marriage, Arvilla had asked Roger to make certain
that he and his mother had resolved this issue so that their
relationship would continue to be good and Roger would tell Arvilla
it was none of her business. (R-496)
On September 4, 1964, the day of the parties marriage, Roger
claimed

he prepared

and

signed

a second

"note"

(Exhibit

19-D

Addendum) (R-586) and gave it to his father to repay him any rents
which were to accrue while the parties were living in the apartment
owned by Roger's parents.

(R-586)

Like the first "note", Roger

and his mother said Arvilla was not involved.

(R-558)

Arvilla

knew nothing about it (R-698); it did not surface until trial (R582).

Attached to it were Roger's calculations that the parties

owed a total of $49,778.33

and nothing had ever been done by

Roger's parents to collect on it. (R-545)
9

For over 26 years nothing was paid on these "debts" and it was
not until December 11, 1990, (ten days before this divorce action
was filed) that Roger paid any monies to his mother on these
"debts".

(R-541)

Between December 11 and 14, 1990 he withdrew a

total of $66,785.00 from the parties savings account to "repay"
these "debts".

(R-599, 695)

At trial, Arvilla argued that neither of these "debts" should
be charged against the marital estate.

She argued, in her Trial

Brief, that these "debts" in any event were invalid and raised
adequacy of terms, statute of limitations, estoppel, and fraudulent
conveyance defenses (R-112).

Roger argued that these "debts" were

marital obligations and should be repaid to his mother and denied
that these would ever come back to him and the sole surviving heir
of his mother f s estate (his only brother, Roland, had died).

(R-

716)
With this evidence before it, the trial court did something
very unusual but most erroneous.

It found that the "Hallmark note"

was a marital obligation and that Roger's mother should be repaid
$14,800.84 in principal and $25,752.87 in interest for a total of
$40,553.74.

(R-166-167)

paying the "rent note"

It then found that Arvilla could avoid
by raising the statute of limitations

defense and did not include it as a marital obligation.

(R-157)

Vacant Lot
In the sixties, Roger's parents acquired a vacant lot next to
Roger's and Arvilla ! s marital

residence.

(R-642)

Evidently,

Roger's father had wanted to build a home on the ground into which
10

he and his wife would ultimately move. (R-551) Roger f s father died
in 1969 (R-562) and Roger's mother elected not to go forward with
this building plan.
Living

Trust

(R-551)

established

and

The lot was then transferred into a
created

by

Roger's mother, Mrs.

Finlayson, for her benefit with Roger serving as Trustee.

In 1978,

she and Roger caused a Warranty Deed to be prepared which both
signed as grantors in their respective capacities, conveying this
lot to Roger and Arvilla as tenants in common.
Addendum)

(Exhibit 31-P, See

It was delivered and recorded at that time. (R-562, 563)

Since 1978, Roger and Arvilla paid all of the taxes on the
lot, (R-554, 563, 650) weeded it and maintained it.

(R-650)

Roger

and his mother testified the transfer was only to allow Roger to
sell the property.

(R-650, 552)

The property had never been

listed for sale and in the last 13 years, Roger said he received
only

one offer on

it.

(R-651)

Arvilla

said

she had

always

understood the lot to have been given to Roger and her by his
mother.

(R-501)

The issue of ownership was raised by Roger only

after this divorce had commenced.

Arvilla claimed the lot was

marital property.

(R-457) Roger claimed it was still owned by his

mother.

The trial court again agreed with Roger and

(R-652)

ordered it excluded from the marital estate and returned to Roger's
mother.

(R-155, 156)

The court relied solely on the testimony of

Roger and his mother in making this decision.

(R-293)

Personal Property
During the marriage the parties had acquired substantial items
of

personal

property

requiring

valuation

11

and

division.

(See

Exhibits 8-P, 11-P, 12-P, 26--D)

Because of the problem1s Arvilla

had with Roger while the divorce was pending, she requested that
the court aid her in valuing and dividing this property.

(R-731)

Roger said he thought the property should be divided by "flipping
a coin".

(R-715)

At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial

court ruled from the bench and advised the parties that it was not
going to deal with this issue other than to have his bailiff "flip
a coin" and the party winning the "flip" could select the first
room of furniture with this procedure to then alternate until all
of the rooms had been selected.

(R-338)

Unnecessary Attorney's Fees
Ms. Donovan, by agreed proffer, testified that Arvilla had
incurred a total of $7,142.50 in attorney's fees and costs and that
in her opinion $2,599.15 of those fees were incurred solely as a
result of the uncooperative attitude of Roger.
cross examined on this.

(R-552) She was not

With this undisputed evidence before it,

the trial court ruled that Arvilla should receive only $500.00
towards her fees based upon Roger's failure to cooperate in listing
the home (R-160) and the problems he caused with visitation (R351) .
POST TRIAL PROCEEDINGS
After trial, Roger's counsel prepared proposed Findings and
Conclusions.

Arvillafs counsel objected and the trial court, at a

hearing on those objections, supplemented the original proposed
Findings.

(R-358 to 392)
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Arvilla then made a Motion for New Trial claiming a number of
errors and irregularities. (R-2 05)

The court issued a Memorandum

Decision denying that Motion (R-282 to 298) and Arvilla then timely
filed this Appeal.

(R-315)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I

It was correct for the trial court to conclude that the 1964
"Rent Note" was not a legally enforceable marital obligation.
was

incorrect

for the

trial

court

to

conclude

that the

It
1962

"Hallmark Note" was a legally enforceable marital obligation and
half of which was chargeable to Arvilla.

It is totally unequitable

to require Arvilla to be responsible for a 28 year old obligation
that Roger's mother said "was none of her affair and about which
she had little if any knowledge".
On a strictly

legal basis both notes were barred by the

Statute of Limitations.

Also under these facts Roger's parents

were barred by the Doctrine of Laches from collecting on the debts
and both Roger and his mother were estopped by their own conduct
from trying to enforce these obligations against Arvilla.

Finally,

the trial court gave relief to Rogerfs mother which she could not
have achieved by filing an action of her own.
POINT II
The
presented

evidence
to

the

and
trial

particularly
court

in

the

relation

objective
to

the

evidence,
vacant

lot

overwhelmingly supports a finding that the lot was given to Roger
and Arvilla by Roger's mother in 1978.
13

There was insufficient

evidence to support a finding that Roger and Arvilla held the
property in trust for Roger's mother.

Based on the successful

marshalling of the evidence as is required by Arvilla, this Court
under its equitable powers should make its own findings and order
that this lot be included as a part of the marital estate.
POINT III
Arvilla

incurred

Roger's

of

in

attorney's

fees

and

costs

Arvillafs attorney testified that, in her opinion,

through trial.
$2,599.15

$7,142.50

the

failure

fees were
to

follow

testimony was undisputed.

incurred
court

unnecessarily

orders

and

because

cooperate.

of

This

The trial court found that Roger had

thwarted visitation and failed to cooperate in this listing of the
marital

residence.

In spite of this, the Court only

Arvilla $500.00 in attorney's fees.

awarded

This minimal award when viewed

in light of the undisputed evidence as to the amount of additional
fees and Roger's recalcitrance constitute an abuse of the trial
court's discretion in awarding attorney's fees.
POINT IV
The trial court acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in
the way it conducted the trial, made its findings and conclusions
and valued and divided property.
1)

In particular:

The trial judge slept during portions of the trial and
consequently "missed" important evidence.

2)

The trial judge made inconsistent findings on material
issues not supported by the evidence.

3)

The trial court arbitrarily assigned values to property.
14

4)

The trial judge ordered that personal property would be
divided by the "flip of a coin11.

All of the above prevented Arvilla

from receiving a fair

trial.
POINT V
Because Arvilla was required

to appeal the trial

court's

ruling to prevent substantial injustice to her and because Roger
will have

funds available to him

from his share of the home

proceeds, Arvilla is entitled to be awarded her attorney's fees and
costs incurred in connection with this appeal and cross appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REQUIRING ARVILLA TO
ASSUME ONE-HALF OF A 28 YEAR OLD "DEBT" WHICH
ROGER CLAIMED HE OWED HIS MOTHER.
At

trial, Roger

produced

two

documents

which

he

claimed

represented 26 and 28 year old obligations he said he owed to his
parents.

He asked the trial court to declare these to be marital

debts which would then be paid to his mother from marital funds.
He claimed that $71,672.13 was owed on the "Hallmark note" (R-585)
and that $49,778.33 was owed on the "rent note" (R-589) for a total
of $118,632.32.

(R-598).

A week before this action was filed,

Roger made the four separate payments in cash on these obligations
to his mother in the sum of $66,785.00.

(R-599)

He asked the

Court to require marital funds to repay the remaining $51,847.00.
(R-599)

Arvilla claimed these were not marital obligations and
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even if they were, they were unenforceable against she and her
husband.
In analyzing these respective positions, the trial court did
a strange thing.

It ruled correctly in concluding that the "rent

note" should not be a marital obligation and that even if it was,
the parties had valid statute of limitation defenses which would
preclude Roger f s mother from collecting anything from the parties.
In so holding on the "rent note", the court found:
The separate note from Defendant to his parents for
rental amounts owed to them for marital housing expenses
is held unenforceable, and additional amounts paid to
Mina from joint marital funds shall be charged to
Defendant as a receipt of marital
funds, which
calculations are set forth in Finding paragraph 8, above.
The Defendants father, for reasons not fully disclosed
in the evidence except by circumstantial inference,
wished to maintain control of the store and may or may
not have regarded it as a potential asset owned by
himself. There is no fixed amount, but at the time the
note was made, it was meant to cover inventory, and
readily determinable by the parties, but held some
possible dispute with creditors.
There has been no
payment on this amount, but it has been discussed
throughout the marriage by the parties. The son should
not be forced to plead with the statute of limitations
against his mother. The mother holds a lien for that
inventory as against these litigants. The court treats
these two obligations differently because the store loan
is attributable to the creation of marital property which
the parties have enjoyed, but the rental loan yielded no
asset subject to division,.
With reference to the
"monies for rent" note, this loan was made during the
marriage, with fixed interest at six percent.
It was
intended eventually that it would be paid. There was no
payment on it. The statute of limitations has run. The
wife has the right to plead the statute of limitations.
In justice and equity, she should be regarded as free of
the debt. Payments on that debt are considered voluntary
by Defendant, and come from his share.
Accordingly,
Defendant alone shall be responsible to discharge the
note relating to housing expenses, holding the Plaintiff
harmless therefrom.
(R-185) (Emphasis added)
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The language emphasized above is the correct analysis as to how
both of these "notes11 should have been dealt with.
However, the "Hallmark note" was handled in a totally opposite
and inconsistent way when the trial court erroneously attempted to
create a distinction between the two notes without a difference and
found as follows on the "note" that was signed two years before the
"Rent note".
Prior to the marriage, Defendant borrowed funds, in the
amount of $14,800.84, from his parents to open a Hallmark
store in the Cottonwood Mall, which was operated by
Defendant prior to the marriage and by both parties
during the marriage, and was later sold during the
marriage.
Said obligation was evidenced by a written
promissory note, dated September 4, 1962 with stated
interest of 6% per cent per annum, but without reference
to simple or compound interest. While the court finds
both parties substantially contributed to the operation
and success of the business, the court finds that
although the business and its proceeds were in large part
marital property, equity requires that the originally
borrowed set-up funds be repaid by the parties from
marital assets. The Court also finds that without this
loan from Defendant's parents, the parties would not have
had the opportunity to engage in and built the business,
and reap its benefits. Thus, Defendant's repayment of
funds to his mother in late 1990 were properly paid by
marital funds held in a joint savings account. The Court
finds simple interest to be applicable, and that interest
accrued in the amount of $888.03 per year for 29 years
($25,752,87 total interest through trial), which, added
to the principal amount, equals a total obligation of
$40,553.74. Defendant made several repayments on said
note in 1990. (R-184)
In attempting to analyze the trial court's reasoning in making
what is simply an inconsistent and unjustified distinction, the
following facts should be kept in mind.
1.

Each "note" was prepared by Roger.

2.

Each "note" was signed only by Roger.
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3.

At trial, Arvilla questioned the authenticity of both
documents after "surfacing11 some 26-28 years after the
fact.

4.

Neither "note11 states a sum.

5.

Neither "note" has a payment date or language that it is
payable "on demand".

6.

Roger produced no documents to substantiate he had
received any monies from his father.

7.

(R-696)

Roger's family didn't want Arvilla involved in these
transactions.

8.

(R-541, 558, 698)

No payments were made on either "note" by Roger until the
start of this action.

9.

(R-696)

No demands for payments were made by Roger's parents.
(R-545, 586)

10.

Roger said Arvilla never really knew how much was owed.
(R-698)

The trial court erred in finding the "Hallmark note" to be a
marital obligation subject to repayment to Roger's mother.
reason

for

this

error

is

that

neither

"note" was

a

The

legally

enforceable obligation against either party because both debts were
subject to valid Statute of Limitations and "laches" defenses.

In

addition, the conduct of Roger and his mother, over the last 26
years, amounts to an estoppel which would prevent either of them
from recovering any amounts for these "debts" from Arvilla.
It is well established that trial courts have considerable
discretion

in dividing marital property and allocating marital
18

debt.

Section

30-3-5 Utah

Code Annotated

(1953

as amended).

Arvilla recognizes and acknowledges that principle.

However, the

facts of this case clearly reflect that the trial court abused that
broad discretion in finding that the "Hallmark Note" was a "marital
debt", one half of which was chargeable to Arvilla and for that
matter in finding that the "debt" was an enforceable debt against
either party.
First, neither "note" set forth a sum certain as to what the
obligation was or what "the debt" would ultimately be.
and his mother acknowledged

Both Roger

on several occasions during

their

testimony that these loans "were none of Arvillafs business"
541, 558).

(R-

Arvilla was never involved in either transaction and

Roger admitted that she was never informed of any specific amounts,
Roger, at trial, claimed were due (R-698).
Under these facts it was unconscionable for the trial court to
impose responsibility on Arvilla to repay one half of a 28 year old
"debt" about which she knew little, if anything.

In addition, the

bulk of the marital estate was limited to proceeds which would be
generated

from

the

sale

of the parties

home

and

vacant

lot.

Arvilla was unskilled, and by the trial court's own finding capable
of earning only a minimum wage.

She was 49 years old.

Roger was

the sole surviving child of his mother.
For

the

trial

court

to

reduce

the

marital

estate

by

$40,533.74, the amount the trial court found to be due on the note
after 28 years and to require that that sum be paid to Roger f s 92
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year old mother was patently unfair and contrary to all principles
of equity and fairness.
Putting equity aside for the moment, it was also an error in
law for the Court to find the "Hallmark Note" an enforceable legal
obligation.

First, the Statute of Limitations for enforcing any

such obligation by Roger ! s mother had long run.

Section 78-12-23

Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) provides that any action to
collect a debt based

upon an

brought within six years.

"instrument

in writing" must be

Rogerfs parents never brought an action

to collect either "note" over a 26-28 year period.

The trial court

correctly recognized that failure on the "rent note" and simply
ignored

that

failure

on

the

"Hallmark

note".

To

do

so

was

reversible legal error.
Second, the failure of Roger f s parents to take any action
whatsoever to collect on these notes for this lengthy period of
time invokes the "laches" bar prohibiting them from collecting this
obligation from either Roger or Arvilla.

In Plateau Min. v. Utah

Division of State Lands, 802 P. 2d 720 (Utah 1990) the Court defined
the Doctrine of Laches as follows:
Laches bars a recovery when there has been a
delay by one party causing a disadvantage to
the other party. Papanikolas Bros. Enters, v.
Sucrarhouse Shopping Center Assoc. , 53 5 P. 2d
1256, 1260 (Utah 1975).
Laches has two
elements: (1) lack of diligence on the part
of the claimant and (2) an injury to the
defendant because of the lack of diligence.
Id. at 1260.
Id. at 731.
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Clearly, Roger f s parents' delay in collecting the "debt" was,
at a minimum, a lack of diligence which caused Arvilla substantial
injury in the form of responsibility for one-half the "debt".
Third, both Roger and his mother are estopped from seeking
repayment

of any of these monies

from Arvilla.

In Brixen &

Christopher, Arch, v. Elton, 777 P.2d 1039 (Utah App. 1989) this
Court held:
Estoppel is an equitable doctrine which
precludes parties from asserting their rights
where their actions render it inequitable to
allow them to assert those rights. Estoppel
requires proof of three elements:
(1) a
statement, admission, act, or failure to act
by one party inconsistent with a later
asserted
claim;
(2)
the
other
party f s
reasonable action or inaction based upon the
first party's statement, admission, act, or
failure to act; and (3) injury to the second
party that would result from allowing the
first party to contradict or repudiate the
statement, admission, act, or failure to act.
Id. at 1043.

See also CECO Corp. v. Concrete Specialists,

Inc. , 772 P.2d 967, 970 (Utah 1989); Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430
(Utah 1983) .
The estoppel elements set out in Brixen, supra, are present in
this case.
1)

Both Roger and his mother's testimony indicating that
these "loans" were none of Arvillafs affairs; Roger's
failure to pay anything on these debts until one week
before the divorce action was filed and Roger's mother's
failure to make any demand for payment over a 2 6 year
period are unquestionably statements and failures to act
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inconsistent with the claim for payment they made at
trial.
2)

Arvilla fs assumption that no such debt existed or that
the same had been taken care of by Roger was reasonable
given the long passage of time, the history of gift
giving

by Roger's parents

and

Roger's

dominance

and

control over the family finances; and,
3)

Arvilla would be damaged to the extent of over $20,000.00
if Roger and his mother were allowed to now claim the
"debts" are due and owing.

Roger and his mother are estopped from claiming Arvilla is in
any way obligated on these obligations.
Finally, the actions of the trial court in enforcing

the

"Hallmark note" were entirely inappropriate because, in so doing,
it allowed Roger's mother to secure legal relief from an equitable
action to which she was not a party.

Furthermore, it allowed

Roger's mother to secure relief which could not have been obtained
in any independent action filed by her against Roger and Arvilla
for the same reasons set out above.
The trial court correctly concluded that the "Rent note" was
not

a

marital

incorrectly

obligation

concluded

that

chargeable
the

"Hallmark

obligation chargeable against Arvilla.
court's order should be vacated.
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against

Arvilla.

note" was

It

a marital

That portion of the trial

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
VACANT LOT NEXT TO THE MARITAL RESIDENCE WAS
NOT MARITAL PROPERTY AND IN REQUIRING THAT THE
PARTIES QUIT CLAIM THEIR INTEREST IN THIS
PROPERTY BACK TO ROGER'S MOTHER.
In 1978 the parties received a Warranty Deed to the vacant lot
next to the marital residence.

The deed was signed by Roger as

trustee, and his mother as settlor, and conveyed this lot to Roger
and

Arvilla

as

tenants

(Exhibit 3IP - Addendum)
the marital estate.
The

trial

court

in

common

without

any

reservations.

Arvilla included this property as part of

Roger claimed the property was his mother's.

erroneously

agreed

with

Roger

and

made

following finding.
The Court finds that during the marriage (in 1978) Mina
Finlayson, the Defendant's mother, and/or a trust related
to her, deeded real property located at 4946 Highland
Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah, jointly to the parties,
which deed was duly delivered and recorded.
Said
property is a vacant lot located adjacent to the marital
home, and was owned by Mina Finlayson with her husband,
who died prior to the transfer of record title. From the
testimony of Mina Finlayson and other witnesses at trial,
the Court finds that Mina had, at the time of the
transfer to the parties, decided to sell the property and
as a result, deeded the property to the parties as
trustees, to maintain and attempt to sell the property
for her. The Court further finds that said transfer was
without donative intent, that no equitable interest
passed to the parties, and that Mina ! s intent was solely
to allow the parties to act as her agents in maintaining
and selling the lot. Marital funds were used to pay the
property taxes for such parcel as they came due. The
Defendant did not request reimbursement for the taxes
from his mother because of the two note obligations owed
to her (more fully described in Finding paragraph 13,
below) were of a substantial nature and had not yet been
repaid.
All dealings with the property have occurred
since the marriage. There has been perhaps six thousand
dollars paid in taxes, but there has been no interest
paid on any other debt.
The Court regards this as a
wash. As such, the Court finds that said real property
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the

is not within the marital estate. Each of the parties
should be ordered to execute a Quit-Claim deed in favor
of Mina Finlayson, her successor, or her designated
agent.
(R-183-184)
It is also well established that a party challenging any
finding by a trial court must marshall all of the evidence in
support of that finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is
inadequate when weighed with other contrary evidence.

[See Crouse

v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836 (Utah 1991).]
The evidence the trial court relied on in support of its
finding

that

the

vacant

lot

belonged

to

Roger's

mother

was

inadequate when considered in light of all the other evidence which
showed that the parties, not Roger's mother, owned this lot.
The evidence in support of the finding was:
1.

Roger's testimony that his mother never gave the lot to
the parties.

2.

(R-642-650)

Roger's mother's testimony that she never intended to
give the lot to the parties.

3.

(R-552-555)

The parties son Kurt's testimony that he thought the lot
had not been given to the parties.
important

to

remember

while

these

(R-568)

[It is

proceedings

were

pending, Roger had alleged giving his son guns and all of
his extensive collection of tools. (R-710)]
The evidence against the finding was:
1.

The language of the Warranty Deed itself.

(Exhibit 31-P

Addendum)
Roger W. Finlayson, Trustee of Mina W.
Finlayson, Revocable Trust, and Mina W.
Finlayson Settler of the Mina WK. Finlayson
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Trust, Grantors of Salt Lake City Utah hereby
convey and warrant to Roger W. Finlayson and
Arvilla K. Finlayson, his wife, Grantees. . .
(Exhibit 31-P)
2.

The fact that both Roger and his mother signed this deed.

3.

The fact that the transfer was made in 1978 - 13 years
ago. (R-644)

4.

The fact that since the transfer, Roger and Arvilla paid
over $6,000.00 in real estate taxes on the ground.

(R-

554, 563, 650)
5.

The fact that no evidence was presented showing that
Roger had ever listed the property

for sale for his

mother.
6.

The fact that in 13 years, Roger testified only one offer
to purchase the lot had been received.

7.

(R-651)

The fact that during the course of these proceedings,
Roger stipulated that the vacant lot could be listed for
sale.

8.

(R-68)

The fact that Rogerfs parents throughout the years gave
Roger money and did not request repayment. (R-54 3)

9.

The fact that Roger, as trustee for his mother, had
complete authority to sell this property without the need
for further conveyance in 1978.

10.

The fact that the 1978 deed was delivered to Roger and
Arvilla and recorded shortly after delivery.

11.

The fact that the parties maintained, weeded and kept up
the property since its transfer to them in 1978. (R-650)
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12.

The fact that the issue of ownership was brought up only
after Arvilla had commenced this divorce against Roger.

13.

The fact that while Rogerfs father was living, there had
been discussions of Roger's parents1 building a home on
this lot.

When he died in 1969, Roger f s mother said she

no longer wanted to pursue this project.
14.

(R-551)

The fact that Arvilla believed she and Roger had owned
the

lot

since

1976

(R-47)

and

that

it

was

her

understanding that she and Roger could sell the lot and
keep the proceeds.
15.

(R-90, 91)

The fact that Roger"s mother had had no involvement with
the property since 1978.

16.

(R-563)

The fact that Roger was the sole surviving child of his
mother.

(R-716)

Clearly, the foregoing demonstrates objectively that the 1978
transfer was a gift to Roger and his wife, Arvilla.

The subjective

testimony of interested parties is the only evidence which supports
the erroneous conclusion that it was not a gift.
In determining a grantor's intent as it relates to the making
of a gift, it is well established that the trier of fact must
consider all of the circumstances surrounding the making of a gift.
[See Stanley v. Stanley, 97 Utah 520, 92 P.2d 465 (Utah 1939) and
Mower v. Mower, 64 Utah 260, 228 P.2d 911, 914 (Utah 1924).]
It is not sufficient to consider only the testimony of parties
having a direct interest in either upholding or challenging the
gift.

In this case, the trial court simply ignored the objective
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credible

evidence

related

to

this

transfer

and

accepted

the

subjective testimony of very interested persons in finding that the
transfer of this lot was not a gift to Roger and Arvilla.

In so

doing, the trial court excluded a significant marital asset all to
Arvilla's detriment.
It is a well established principle of appellate law that an
appellate court, in an equitable action such as divorce, can review
de novo all of the evidence presented at trial and make its own
findings and conclusions if it chooses to do so and if equity and
justice require. [See Wright v. Wright, 586 P.2d 443 (Utah 1978)
and Wall v. Wall, 700 P.2d 1124 (Utah 1985).]
The Findings and Conclusions of the trial court related to the
lot should be vacated.

All the evidence related to the vacant lot

should be reviewed by this Court and this Court should enter its
own findings to prevent a substantial

injustice to Arvilla in

eliminating this substantial asset from the marital estate.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ARVILLA ONLY
$500.00 OF THE $7,142.50 IN ATTORNEYS FEES
AND COSTS REQUESTED WHEN ROGERSfS ACTIONS/
INACTIONS CAUSED HER TO INCUR A SUBSTANTIAL
PORTION OF THOSE FEES.
When a party to a divorce action acts or fails to act in such
a way as to cause the other party to incur unnecessary attorney's
fees, it is most appropriate and permissible for the trial court to
require

the

recalcitrant

additional fees.

party

to

reimburse

the

other

those

[See Porco v Porco 752 P. 20 at 368 (Utah App.

1988) ]
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For a court not to require such reimbursement allows the
uncooperative party to unfairly take advantage of the other party.
Such an approach sends a clear message to the offending party that
such

tactics

and

behaviour

are

permissible

without

fear

of

sanction.
In this case, the record is filled with incidents of Roger's
behavior

demonstrating

lack

of

respect

for the

principles

fairness, orders of the court and the judicial process.

of
For

example;
1.

Just before the divorce was

filed, he withdrew

over

$66,000.00 from the parties joint bank account (R-695),
removed items from the safe and property from the home,
requiring Arvilla to secure a Restraining Order.
2.

He attempted to manipulate his daughter to cause her to
be alienated from her mother.

3.

(R-22)

(R-77, 452, 38, 351)

He would not cooperate in the listing of the marital
residence and lot. (R-77, 160)

4.

He would not repair the house and make it ready for sale.
(R-77, 458)

5.

He would not cooperate in encouraging visitation.

(R-

707)
6.

Even after trial, he continued to resist selling the
house; wouldn't repair it and make it ready for sale; he
wouldn't

transfer

titles to vehicles; he

refused

to

cooperate in selecting a family counsellor to work with
the

parties

daughter;
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and

he

continued

to

be

uncooperative

in

dividing

personal

property

and

in

refusing to execute documents necessary to divide the
parties stock, all as he was ordered to by the court. (R174-180)
During the trial, Arvilla testified extensively about the
problems she had encountered in getting cooperation from Roger.
(R-429, 448, 452, 458, 460, 492, 727, 731)
testifying

as

testimony

and

Addendum)

and

to

fees

requested,

introduced
backup

a

substantiated

Request

documents

Arvilla's attorney, in

for

(Exhibit

Fees

her

client's

(Exhibit

16-P,

17-P, Addendum)

which

reflected what Ms. Donovan concluded were $2,599.15 in unnecessary
fees caused by Roger's actions.
regard was not challenged.
Even

Roger

admitted

prolonged the case11

Ms. Donovan's testimony in that

(R-53)
that

he

had

been

"hard

headed

and

(R-690) and that he really didn't want to

immediately sell the home.

(R-711-712).

Roger's attorney in his

closing admitted his client had been obstinate.

(R-746)

With all of this evidence before it, the trial court in its
ruling from the bench stated:
The Court believes there has been unnecessary
proceedings brought on by his failure to let her
see the child and this type of thing, so that he
must make a contribution of $500.00 to her fees
because of those items. (R-351)
In its Findings the trial court stated:
Defendant should be ordered to pay plaintiff's
attorney's fees in the sum of $500 and the same
should be awarded due to legal expenses incurred in
pursing the sale of the home and other issues . . .
(R-160)
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And, finally, in its Memorandum Decision denying Arvilla's
Motion

for

New

Trial,

the

trial

court

again

noted

this

recalcitrance when it stated:
In fact, the evidence was strong that he frequently
did not carry out intentions . . . his or other
people f s as for example the sale of the house as
ordered by the Court. (R-293) (Emphasis added)
While the trial court recognized Roger's noncompliance, the
fee award it made was wholly inadequate given the uncontroverted
evidence of the additional unnecessary fees and the fact that Roger
would have the financial means available to pay those fees from his
share of the home proceeds when the home was sold.
Arvilla

should

be

awarded

an

additional

$2,099.15

in

attorney's fees for the additional, unnecessary legal fees Roger
caused her to incur.

This sum reflects a $500.00 credit for the

initial award of fees which the trial court made.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED IN AN ARBITRARY AND
CAPRICIOUS MANNER IN THE WAY IT CONDUCTED THE
TRIAL, MADE ITS FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS AND
ORDERED THE PROPERTY DISTRIBUTED, CONSEQUENTLY
DEPRIVING ARVILLA OF THE COMPLETE, FAIR AND
IMPARTIAL TRAIL TO WHICH SHE WAS ENTITLED.
Arvilla requests this Court to consider the relief requested
in this Point IV only if this Court decides not to grant the relief
she has requested in Points I, II and V of this Brief.
The record in this case is substantial, in part due to Roger f s
failure to comply with court orders, but also in part due to the
way the trial judge conducted the trial, and made his findings and
final orders.
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Following the trial court's ruling from the bench and entry of
Findings and Decree, Arvilla made a Motion for New Trial.

(R-605)

One of the reasons for requesting a new trial was the fact that the
trial judge had slept during portions of the trial which involved
witness

testimony.

affidavit

(R-187)

That

filed by Sara Ryan

claim

was

supported

by

an

(R-200) a person who sat in the

courtroom throughout the trial.

Roger filed a counter affidavit

claiming the judge did not sleep.

(R-264)

The judge in responding to this allegation in his Memorandum
Decision (R-282) didn't deny that he may have slept but stated "I
do not recall sleeping on this case.11

(R-282)

He then goes on to

state that he felt he hadn't "missed" anything, and concludes by
stating "The contest was joined but there was very littl
conflict in the testimony on the major issues."
The record reflects otherwise.

(sic)

(R-282-283)

For example, Roger testified

he prepared the "two" notes, (Exhibits 18-D and 19-D) and that all
of

the

handwriting

on

the

"notes" was

his.

(R-170)

Judge

Wahlquist, in his Memorandum Decision denying the Motion for New
Trial, states in relation to the "Hallmark note" that,
"This note is written in the handwriting of the
father, who has been dead for many years.
(R291)
He also states:
"The father was worried about losing the money if
the new venture failed so he wrote out a note which
was signed by the son . . . (R-291)
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Unfortunately, no such evidence exists in the record and if
the court was in error on such a significant issue, this error
alone is grounds for a new trial.
The trial court also acted in a most arbitrary and capricious
way in the manner it arrived at values of certain items of property
and in the way it ordered them divided.

Arvilla has included in

the Addendum to this Brief, a complete transcript of the Judge's
Ruling

from the Bench and his Memorandum

Motion for New Trial. (R-322-355)

Decision denying the

Arvilla respectfully urges this

Court to read those documents in their entirety to gain the full
impact as to how the trial courtfs final decision was reached.
(This Court's attention is also directed to the transcript of the
hearing

on

Arvilla's

Objection's

to

Findings

(R-356-392)

for

further examples of the capriciousness and arbitrariness of the
trial court's method of resolving this case.)
For example, during the ruling, the issue of the value of a
diamond not mentioned during testimony was raised.
knew what it was worth.

Neither party

To resolve that, the court stated:

THE COURT: just an arbitrary point, per se, the
diamond is worth $250.00, and she has to take it
unless he offers her more within 24 hours. She has
to take it at two fifty unless he bids more, then
it will go to the highest bidder. (R-332)
Arvilla testified of her concerns about being able to divide
up the personal property because of the uncooperative
demonstrated by her husband.
requesting

that

each

be

(R-731)
awarded
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attitude

Both parties submitted lists
certain

items

of

property.

(Exhibits 8-P, 11-P, 12-P and 26-D)

In spite of this, the trial

judge ordered the personal property issue resolved as follows:
THE COURT: Suppose I do it this way: We'll have a throw
of a coin.
One of you choose one room, and another
choose another room until I've run out of rooms, and
that's the was the division is. The furniture — be
ready to play that way.
MS. DONOVAN: Each party select a room, and takes all the
furniture in that room?
THE COURT: I'm going to start this action in a minute.
I'm going to throw up a coin, and have defense counsel
throw the coin. Plaintiff's counsel call heads or tails.
If she's correct in her call, then she makes a choice for
her client — the first choice of room. Then it will be
the defendant's choice, and the plaintiff's choice, and
then the defendant's choice until I run out of rooms.
And then I'll count the garage as one room.
But the
tools are already gone. You understand what we're going
to do?
MS. DONOVAN:
THE COURT:

I think so, Your Honor.
You've got the rules?

MS. DONOVAN:

I think I've got the rules.

MR. RUSSELL:

I think I'm with her.

MS. DONOVAN:

You're including the garage?

THE COURT: You're not excluding the garage.
counts on the end, but the tools are gone.

The garage

The flippancy of the trial court regarding dividing personal
property is clearly demonstrated by the trial court's statement in
response to Mr. Russell's question about dividing items such as the
fireplace insert, utility trailer, cement mixer, riding lawnmower,
mulcher, snowblower and canoe, when Judge Wahlquist said,
"You can work that out on your picnic."
(Emphasis added.)
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(R-345)

These litigants were entitled to better treatment than what
was afforded them by the trial court in relation to an issue which
was important to both of them.

The record on its face reflects an

inattentive trial judge who acted in an arbitrary and capricious
manner in rendering his decision and without question provides
grounds for a new trial.
As stated at the beginning of this Point, if Arvilla is not
granted the relief she has requested in Points I, II and V of this
Brief, then she requests she be granted

a new trial before a

different judge.
POINT V
ARVILLA
IS ENTITLED TO BE AWARDED
THE
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS INCURRED BY HER IN
THE MAINTENANCE OF THIS APPEAL AND THE DEFENSE
OF ROGER'S CROSS APPEAL.
Section

30-3-3

Utah

Code

Ann.

(1953

as

amended)

is

the

statutory basis for an award of attorney's fees in divorce actions.
It states that:
The Court may order either party to pay to the
clerk a sum of money . . . to enable such
party (adverse) to prosecute or defend the
action.
Id.

(Parenthetical language and emphasis added)
This section has been interpreted to apply to attorney's fees

incurred both at the trial and appellate levels.
Dahlbercr, 77 Utah 157, 292 P.214

(1930)

See Dahlberg v.

Carter v. Carter, 584,

P.2d 904 (Utah 1978) and Maughan v Mauqhan, 770 P.2d 162 (Ut. App.
1989) .
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Clearly, the statute gives this Court the authority to award
Arvilla her attorney's fees to allow her to "prosecute" the appeal
to a successful resolution in her favor and also to allow her to
"defend" Roger's cross appeal.
This Court has also consistently

held that a party to a

divorce action who is successful on an appeal, is entitled to an
award of attorneyfs fees and costs incurred in connection with
maintaining the appeal. (See Crouse v Crouse, 817 P. 2d 839 (Ut.
App. 1991)
Points I, II, III and IV of this brief clearly demonstrate
that the trial court committed significant errors in accepting the
positions argued by Roger in connection with treating the Hallmark
"note" as marital debt; in excluding the undeveloped lot as marital
property; in failing to award appropriate attorneyfs fees, and in
arbitrarily dividing and valuing the personal property.

In so

ordering, the trial court substantially diminished the marital
estate so as to give Arvilla no other alternative than to appeal to
this Court to correct these inequities.
This Court should award Arvilla all of her attorneyfs fees and
costs related to pursuing this appeal and defending Arvilla f s cross
appeal and the matter should be remanded to the trial court before
a different judge for a determination of the same and entry of an
appropriate judgment against Roger.
CONCLUSION
It

is always most unfortunate

emotional

and

financial

trauma

for parties

of divorce.
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It

to endure
is even

the
more

unfortunate when one of the spouses to a divorce action attempts
not only to protect his/her rights, but overreaches in an attempt
to achieve a resolution unfairly weighted in his/her favor.

Such

was the case in this matter.
The record reflects that Roger continually failed to cooperate
with the directives of the Court.
relationship

between

Arvilla

and

He attempted
her

to taint the

daughter;

he

thwarted

visitation, and he would not cooperate in the listing, sale and
repair of the marital residence and adjacent lot.
The record also demonstrates that Roger tried to "cut the
pattern to fit the cloth" so that he would ultimately end up with
the lion's share of what these parties had jointly worked
during their 27 year marriage.

for

He resurrected 26 year old plus

obligations he claimed were owed to his mother; he claimed a lot
given to Arvilla and him over 13 years ago really wasn't a gift but
rather was property of his mother; he gave marital property away;
and incredibly, he asked the court to award him alimony and require
Arvilla to pay him $15,751.00 in property settlement.

(R-687)

Perhaps the flavor of Roger's attitude and actions can best be
captured

in reviewing the most perceptive comment made by Ms.

Donovan in her closing argument:
I think the court can see what's happening.
By the time we're through with this case
there's no property left. Either his mother
owns it, his son owns it, or he's given it
away, or he's taken it out of the estate.
That's not fair after a twenty-seven year
marriage. (R-740)
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It was the trial court's duty to recognize that the position
urged by Roger was not fair to both parties.

The trial court did

not fulfill that duty when it required the "Hallmark note" to be
paid from marital funds; ordered the vacant lot transferred back to
Roger's mother and failed to require Roger to reimburse Arvilla for
all of the unnecessary attorney's fees Roger caused her to incur.
Arvilla respectfully requests this Court to correct the errors
of the trial court and grant her the relief requested on page seven
of this brief.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7th day of December, 1992.
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN

Kent M. K a s t i n g V d f <£dilnsel
Sharon A. Donovan
Shannon W. Clark
Attorneys for
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Cross-Respondent.
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1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2
3

October 18, 1991
THE COURT:

The court's going to attempt to

4

render a decision on most items now.

5

there will be some items that will not be covered.

6

want to do it while the attorneys are here.

7

your record, and I'll ask the clerk to keep the record,

8

and you can keep the record too, and that is of the money

9

value of the various items as they are awarded to one

10

party or another.

11

we'll start on that in just a minute.

12

It may be that
I

Please keep

Get your pencil and paper on that, and

First of all, on the basic issues, the court finds

13

that the parties were married at the time alleged, and

14

did have the children they agreed they had.

15

finds that there are irreconcilable differences between

16

the two that makes it impossible for the marriage to

17

continue in a happy state.

18

dissolve the marriage on the basis of irreconcilable

19

differences.

20

The court

Therefore, the court will

I do not, in making this judgment, blame one more

21

than the other.

I do not believe the evidence has faced

22

that issue, and it has not been tried.

23

been tried is only the issue of whether or not the

24

parties can restore the marriage.

25

question no.

The issue that's

The court answers that
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1

As far as the child is concerned, court considers

2

the evaluation that's in the file, and admissible before

3

the court pursuant to stipulation, depicts a child that

4

probably has considerable, serious problems.

5

recommendation made there is that the child's custody,

6

physical custody be awarded to the father.

7

accepts this, and that's the only reasonable alternative

8

before the court at this time.

The mother should have a

9

right of reasonable visitation.

If she desires to do,

The

The court

10

she may also send another person to visit for her, such

11

as sending a son over to contact her, or something of

12

this sort, or perhaps getting the son to go with her, or

13

something of this nature so that perhaps there will be

14

some contact.

15

person in her stead to see the child.

16

substitute, and —

17

want to necessarily throw all this on the back of the

18

other brothers and sisters, but I think they might be

19

useful somewhat in the situation.

20

He must not interfere if she sends a third
He must honor the

because of the hard feelings.

I don't

Court recognizes peculiarities that are here present

21

such as the girl going to the —

fifteen year old

22

daughter going to a father's bedroom, and this type of

23

thing.

24

no reason, or unusual concern, and the court has seen

25

none in this courtroom.

As far as the investigator could find, there is

The court will assume that it is
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1

not a problem of unusual concern.

2

As far as the property is concerned, the first item

3

—

the first thing the court wants to say is this:

As

4

far as the earning power of the two parties is concerned,

5

the court finds that the plaintiff is a very personal

6

lady of about forty-seven.

7

employable as a clerk, or other person who has to meet

8

the public.

9

learning disability that she's here described.

She would be readily

The court accepts that she does have a
And that

10

this would limit her employment some.

11

that she should be charged with an earning capacity at

12

least the minimum wage.

13

Court does believe

The court's heard the testimony about his earning

14

capacity and this type of thing.

The court finds that if

15

encouraged to not work, he will not work.

16

to work, he could work if he had to.

17

that he is like a lot of men his age. When he gets

18

older, he'll find more and more of his friends will have

19

medical problems.

20

pain and suffering, and but he's still capable of doing

21

that.

22

However, the court believes he will have considerable

23

absenteeism, and as a result of that will probably work

24

close to the minimum wage level.

25

earning capacity against him at the minimum wage at this

If encouraged

The court finds

To work will give him a great deal of

Now, he has great skills, and can do many things.

The court will assess
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1

time.

2

The child support can be calculated on the basis

3

here stated.

As far as the assets are concerned, court

4

recognizes that where the two parties have as close to

5

equal earning capacity as they have as they appear before

6

me today, that there should probably be no alimony either

7

way.

8

the best they can.

9

side.

Each party is required to face the world, and do
Court awards no alimony to either

Court also in considering these matters concludes

10

that basically the law of the State of Utah is that all

11

properties that are accumulated of value after marriage,

12

unless there's a reason to view them as otherwise, are

13

community property.

14

nature, should be divided equally, or as near equally as

15

practical.

16

the court to be an approximate equality.

17

recognizes that exact equality is almost impossible.

18

article that might be, for instance clothing.

19

to award her his clothing would be to throw them away,

20

and vice versa.

21

to one or not valuable to the other at all, are valuable

22

in different states.

23

give it to one side, and charge that side with the

24

property, and I must do this.

25

line is not going to be equal.

And in a situation, divorce of this

What the court is about to do is intended by
And the court
An

If I were

There are many things that are of value

That doesn't mean I don't have to

The equation on the bottom
Court recognizes that.
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1

And all this is some type of an equitable effort to do

2

that. Nothing more.

3

First of all, the store.

He had the store before

4

the marriage.

The store had a debt on it before the

5

marriage.

6

store basically is his store.

7

changed its character grossly while the marriage has been

8

in place, and has probably grown in value, perhaps ten

9

times.

Per se this is not community property.

The

However, the store has

Part of this is pure inflation, but part of it is

10

just the fact that they must have done reasonably well at

11

the store, or it would never have sold for what it sold

12

for.

13

property except the debt against it must be recognized,

14

and accepted.

15

been presented is a valid one, and was written on

16

approximately the date there indicated.

17

the interest —

18

states six percent interest.

19

compounding or interest on interest.

20

court does not favor in family dealings, particularly

21

implication that compound interest is intended, the court

22

will accept this instrument as non-compounding.

23

means this debt in reality is the $14,800.54, and that

24

the interest six percent on it is $840.51, and that would

25

be assessible each year then on.

Court believes it should be treated as community

The court believes that the exhibit that's

Court notes that

the $14,008.84, court notes that it
It says nothing about
Inasmuch as the

This
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1

MR. RUSSELL:

2

THE COURT:

I didn't hear the last figure.
I'm using his calculations, and

3

his calculation is that the first year's interst was

4

$840.51. Using this theory, that —

5

that much each year.

6

per se. Do you both follow me on that?

7

the debt would grow

But there's no interest on interest

MS. DONOVAN:

Are you saying, Your Honor,

8

that the interest each year is $841.51, so we multiply

9

that times the number of years that are supposedly due

10

and owing, and that's the amount you're claiming is due

11

and owing to Mina Finlayson?

12

THE COURT:

Yes.

This is I believe

13

interpreted in family dealings, where there's no

14

discussion of compound interest in the debt.

15

figure that out quickly if you'd like.

You can

16

We go next to the issue of the lot next door.

Court

17

does not interpret this property to be marital property.

18

The court does this for two reasons.

19

the court believes that the preponderance of the evidence

20

is that he was given it as trustee to take care of it for

21

his mother.

22

the court could say that the next alternative that the

23

court is faced with is he has been given the property as

24

an advancement on his inheritance.

25

become community property.

The first of all,

However, if for any reason that failed, then

Neither way does it

The court deems it is not
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1

community.

Insofar as the house is concerned, court

2

deems the house to have been purchased, so far as I can

3

tell, while they were together-

4

they were together.

5

so-called debt for rent, $190.00 a month, the court

6

believes that the statute of limitations has run during

7

this period, and that in estoppels also, there's been a

8

sleeping on rights which come into play.

9

effect it's an affirmative defense, and he can waive it

It's been paid for while

It is full community property.

The

Court says in

10

if he wants to, but he can waive it only for himself when

11

he is no longer acting in concert with his wife.

12

cannot waive it for her.

13

debt is chargeable to his side, not her side.

14

question about what I'm saying?

15

MS. DONOVAN:

Any payment he makes on that

saying, Your Honor.

17

statute of limitations has run on the rent?
THE COURT:

There a

I don't understand what you're

16

18

He

On the rent, you're saying that the

Yes.

That's the $190.00 a month

19

for the first five years the marriage, no enforcement has

20

been seriously made since that time.

21

that that is —

22

so that it's not enforceable.

23

has waived it, he can waive it for himself, but he is no

24

longer by the time that occurs her agent.

25

so.

The court believes

that there's been a sleeping on rights,
And if it were, and if he

He cannot in equity waive her rights.

Clearly not
So I deem any
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1

payment he makes on that debt comes out of his share.

2

you both understand what I've said?

3

MS. DONOVAN:

I'm not quite sure.

Do

Are you

4

saying that there's no obligation to pay any rent, but if

5

he does, that's his own?

6

THE COURT:

I say there was an obligation to

7

pay the rent years and years ago.

Such a thing existed.

8

But there was no effort to enforce it, and both through

9

the statute of limitations, as well as estoppel, she

10

could defend against her mother-in-law.

11

not to defend, by the time he made this choice, he was

12

not her agent.

13

his mother the money, but he can't waive it and bind his

14

wife.

15

If he chooses

He's waived it on his own.

MR. RUSSELL:

He still owes

Your Honor, just so I

16

understand, what I perceive that the court is ruling is

17

that Mr. Finlayson does not get any credits against use

18

of marital property for the payment on that particular

19

debt?

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. RUSSELL:

Is that understood?

22

MS. DONOVAN:

Yeah, I think I understand

24

MR. RUSSELL:

Understand, Your Honor.

25

THE COURT:

23

That's true.

that.

Now, we get -- that was the
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1

larger items. Now we get down to the house sale.

2

house, it is true he's in the house, and he's in the

3

house with the girl.

4

how this must best be handled as far as empathy for the

5

child, and the other circumstances that are present.

6

court believes that after the first of the year, for

7

every month that the house is not sold, that he —

8

gets the first $400.00 off the sale in rents.

9

you understand what I'm saying?

10

MS. DONOVAN:

Yes, Your Honor.

11

MR. RUSSELL:

Your Honor, she accrues $400.00

The court has mixed emotions about

as a credit on the proceeds for every month after

13

December of this year?
THE COURT:

The

she

Both of

12

14

The

Yes. At the end of December

—

15

start the first of January, if he still hasn't sold it,

16

she starts getting $400.00 off the top.

17

sold in six months from then, she has a right to petition

18

the court to occupy the house, and proceed to sell it.

19

MR. RUSSELL:

20

THE COURT:

If it is not

June 30th, Your Honor?
Right now.

I don't know much

21

about Salt Lake.

If they were in the northern end of the

22

State, they could not demand a sale in less than six

23

months.

Do you follow me what I'm saying?

24

MS. DONOVAN:

25

THE COURT:

Yes.
We have to understand the rules
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1

on this.

2

MR. RUSSELL:

Six months after the first of

3

the year, she may petition the court to regain

4

possession.

5

THE COURT:

No.

She might petition for the

6

right to take the house, start getting this $400.00 a

7

month.

8

MS. DONOVAN:

Is that six months from now, or

9
10

THE COURT:

Six months from the first of the

11

year.

He really needs to do these repairs that he's been

12

told.

He's got the intelligence.

13

hold that house against his wife's interests, absent some

14

type of a rent, or agreement, such as the $400.00 figure.

15

Now, we've come do what appears to be an impossible

16

number of private things.

17

their own clothing.

18

gets the female jewelry.

19

loose diamond; is that right?

First of all, each party has

He gets the male jewelry, and she

20

MR. RUSSELL:

21

THE COURT:

22

He will not be able to

I understand they've got one

Yes.
What do you say that diamond is

worth?

23

MR. RUSSELL:

We haven't appraised it, Judge.

24

THE COURT:

25

MS. FINLAYSON:

What do you say it's worth?
I don't have -- I don't know.

BUNNY C. NEUENSCHWANDER, CSR, RPR
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1
2
3

THE COURT:

How many karats is it?

Or what

part of a karat?
MS. FINLAYSON:

I only know that was the

4

first diamond, but it was a small one, but what size it

5

was, I have no answer.

6

do have now —

7

I only know that the one that I

THE COURT:

Otherwise they are going to

8

divide the jewelry on a male female basis.

9

trouble with anything but the one diamond?

10
11
12

MR. RUSSELL:

Do I have

With the exception of that one

diamond, I believe it's been divided.
THE COURT:

Court, just an arbitrary point

13

per se, the diamond is worth $250.00, and she has to take

14

it be unless he offers more within twenty-four hours.

15

She has to take it at two fifty unless he bids more.

16

Then it will go to the highest bidder.

17

Now, the dolls, the court believes that the dolls

18

are something if I give him he'll merely sell them, and

19

they will decrease in value where they might have more

20

value to her.

21

value in the neighborhood a thousand dollars.

22

the guns, the court award each side possession of the

23

guns they have, and fix the guns in his favor at a

24

thousand dollars.

25

The court grants her the dolls, fixs their
So far as

Court comes to the tools. When I say tools, I mean
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1

outdoor working for gardening and et cetera, or for

2

automobiles, or for guns.

3

to take them.

4

However the court is aware that we have some things such

5

as the lathe to the effect that the lathe on a secondhand

6

basis is worth in the vicinity of a thousand dollars, and

7

he's got to make his own peace with the son.

8
9

These are the tools.

He's got to make peace with his son.

MR. RUSSELL:

Your Honor, is the one thousand

dollars, is that an aggregate value?

10

THE COURT:

11

he's got to take it.

12

auctioning it.

13

it. At least I'm fearful that she will.

14

He has

That's what I'm counting on, but
If she takes it, she'll end up

She'll be lucky if she gets $600.00 for

We come now to furniture.

I looked at this list of

15

furniture, and it is true in the eyes of the law,

16

furniture per se that he had before he got married would

17

be his. Except if they are kept and used can in

18

connection with the total home atmosphere, they can loose

19

character.

20

items which he had without question before he got

21

married?

22

does —

23

woman then they are partly hers?

24

MR. RUSSELL:

25

What does each say about these furniture

What do you say?

Do you say they are his?

Or

if you live twenty-seven years in a house with a

Your Honor, I think that they

don't loose their character, because there are several
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3

r o o m s in t h e h o u s e w i t h v a r i o u s d e g r e e s of u s a g e , a n d
s o m e of t h o s e r o o m s h a v e t o b e s u s c e p t i b l e f o r s t o r a g e o f

those items.

4

THE COURT:

What could you say on this

5

question, the items which he's listed as owning before

6

the start?

7

MS. DONOVAN:

Your Honor, there are certain

8

items we don't care about, and we're not going to argue

9

about.

But from a legal theory, I think after

10

twenty-seven years, things that are in dispute probably

11

merge. And to try and figure out exactly what he owns,

12

or she owned, or whatever, I think is a very difficult

13

task.

14

MR. RUSSELL:

15

difficult, Your Honor.

16

THE COURT:

I agree it would be extremely

How many chairs and things of

17

this nature are there that he claims have been in the

18

family for forty years?

19
20

MR. RUSSELL:

All I can refer to is the

handwritten list that he made out.

21

THE COURT:

Suppose I do it this way:

We'll

22

have a throw of a coin.

One of you choose one room, and

23

another choose another room until I've run out of the

24

rooms, and that's the way the division is.

25

—

The furniture

be ready to play that way.
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11
2

MS. DONOVAN:

Each party select a room, and

takes all the furniture in that room?

3

THE COURT:

I'm going to start this action in

4

a minute.

I'm going to throw up a coin, and have defense

5

counsel throw the coin.

6

or tails.

7

choice for her client —the first choice of room.

8

it will be the defendant's choice, and the plaintiff's

9

choice, and then the defendant's choice until I run out

Plaintiff's counsel call heads

If she's correct in her call, then she makes a
Then

10

of rooms. And then I'll count the garage as one room.

11

But the tools are already gone.

12

we're going to do?

You understand what

13

MS. DONOVAN:

14

THE COURT:

15

MS. DONOVAN:

I think I've got the rules.

16

MR. RUSSELL:

I think I'm with her.

17

MS. DONOVAN:

You're including the garage?

18

THE COURT:

19
20
21
22

I think so, Your Honor.

You've got the rules?

You're not excluding the garage.

The garage counts on the end, but the tools are gone.
MS. DONOVAN:

You're giving all the tools to

Mr. Finlayson.
THE COURT:

He gets all the tools, but he's

23

got to make some kind of peace with Kurt. I think he's

24

told Kurt he owns all the tools.

25

MS. DONOVAN:

He's given everything to Kurt.

Page 16
BUNNY C. NEUENSCHWANDER, CSR, RPR

—

00335

1

THE COURT:

I think the tools are his. All

2

right.

3

counsel call it, unless defense attorney wants to throw

4

it.

5

I'll have the baliff throw the coin.

MR. RUSSELL:

No.

No.

Plaintiff's

Baliff is fine.

6

Your Honor, if I might just see if we can resolve

7

something in this area —

8
9

THE COURT:

If you want to go out to the

house, I don't know whether you need a baliff to referee

10

or not, but otherwise I'm going to divide by lot from

11

here on down.

12
13
14
15

I'll divide cars in a minute.

MR. RUSSELL:

minutes to talk about this, Judge?
THE COURT:

Let me take cars, first, and then

I'll go away.

16

MR. RUSSELL:

17

THE COURT:

18

Your Honor, can we have two

Thank you, Your Honor.
Is it my understanding that she

generally drives the Accord?

19

MS. FINLAYSON:

20

THE COURT:

Yes.

And is it my understanding that

21

he generally drives the jeep?

Okay.

You've each got the

22

car you generally drive.

23

better use, and get more money out of the Dodge van.

24

I'll give it to him, assign it's value at $500.00. The

25

dune buggy, court will assign it to him, an assess its

I believe that he will make
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1

value at only $300.00.

2

more than four hundred today.

3

go for that figure, or does she wasn't to take it?

4

MS. DONOVAN:

5

THE COURT:

If she wants it, she must bid now
Does she wasn't to let it

We'll let it go, Your Honor.
Come to the mobile home.

6

put a very high value on it; is that true?

7

value?

8
9
10

MS. DONOVAN:

THE COURT:

It was based upon an appraisal

What do you say it's worth?

are you bidding on it?

12

MS. DONOVAN:

What

The appraisal was between ten

13

and twelve.

14

saying it's like three or four.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. RUSSELL:

They've come up with a number of appraisals

What do you say it's worth?
Between thirty-six and $3,900.

We got four appraisals in that range.

18

THE COURT:

19

Put her down for ten thousand.

20

What is her

that she said.

11

17

She's

She can have it at ten thousand.

Court will be in recess for five minutes while you

21

people talk about tomato catsup and the dishes.

22

urge you make some kind of a division so that they both

23

end up in the capacity to keep house.

24

MR. RUSSELL:

25

THE COURT:

I would

Thank you, Your Honor.
Court is in recess until called.
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1

(a recess was taken)

2

THE COURT:

3

MS. DONOVAN:

4

Have you made any progress?
We're getting closer, Your

Honor.

5

THE COURT:

Let's talk about how closer.

6

MR. RUSSELL:

Judge, I think that Ms. Donovan

7

and I, rather than flip a coin, and use the lists of

8

personal property, Your Honor, would prefer to set some

9

rules, and go out to the residence where we've got

10

physical, tangible things to pick up and look at to do

11

this, and we have a good enough professional relationship

12

that I think we can maintain, and do it more officially

13

than the court can by using these lists.

14

THE COURT:

15

just the two of you?

You need the baliff with you, or

16

MS. DONOVAN:

I don't think so.

17

MR. RUSSELL:

We did this before with the

18

previous counsel, Your Honor, so the four of us —

19

three of us, and previous counsel have done the

20

inventory.

21
22
23

THE COURT:

the

Have you got these figures that

you got running?
MR. RUSSELL:

We've got your figures, Judge,

24

and what I think we need to do is to continue with that

25

through the motorcycles, and the boat on what I call the
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1

big ticket items, and then have the court give us its

2

ruling as to the intangible personal properties, the life

3

insurance, the Putnam Fund.

4

THE COURT:

What I try and do is use this so

5

that when I got to the bottom line I've got equality.

6

Some of you will have some types of things you'd rather

7

do with others.

8
9

MR. RUSSELL:

Otherwise —

I'm sorry, I don't understand

what the court has said.

10
11

Here's your chance.

THE COURT:

I don't rule who owns those

things. All I care about is how much they are worth.

12

MS. DONOVAN:

There are some items that we're

13

asking as to the court's value.

14

THE COURT:

If you want me to set values on

15

it, I can do it, but —

16

them for bid purposes.

17

MR. RUSSELL:

and then you can go out and count

I guess that's what we need is

18

values on the motorcycles, and the boat, and a ruling on

19

the —

20

THE COURT:

The ruling usually used is this:

21

That the party who listed is as the most valuable ends up

22

having to take it at that value.

23

MR. RUSSELL:

24

THE COURT:

25

All right.
Do you understand what I'm

saying?
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1

MR, RUSSELL:

2

THE COURT:

3

personalized things.

4
5

When they are not highly

MR. RUSSELL:

THE COURT:

7

MR. RUSSELL:

8

THE COURT:

10

worth —

On the Jeep?
Yes.

On the car?

The car I think is

I think the car and the Jeep, I'm equating that,

MR. RUSSELL:

The car and the jeep are

seventy-four five?

13
14

Your Honor, we

about seventy-four five.

11
12

All right.

didn't ever get values on the Honda and the Jeep.

6

9

Yes, Your Honor.

MS. DONOVAN:

You're saying they are of equal

value?

15

THE COURT:

Roughly.

16

MS. DONOVAN:

I'm not clear.

Are you saying

17

the Honda Accord and the Jeep Wagoneer are worth how

18

much?

19

THE COURT:

$7,450.00 each.

I understand

20

that some of you value them higher than that, some of

21

them lower.

22
23
24
25

MR. RUSSELL:

All right.

I understand.

I

missed that point.
MS. DONOVAN:

What about the hondas, all

those motorcycles, Your Honor?
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1

THE COURT:

2

motorcycles for you?

3

at three hundred; is that true?

4

MS. DONOVAN:

Yes.

5

MR. RUSSELL:

That's an agreed value, Your

6

You want me to fix the
I take it '78 750 you both valued

Honor.

7

THE COURT:

The '85 Honda 700, court will set

8

the value at eighteen hundred.

9

250, I recognize I can miss somewhat here, only owned one

The '84 Honda, that's the

10

motorcycle in my life, and it was smarter than me, and I

11

went down.

12

But I'll set it at four fifty.

13

and I assume this is two of them?

14
15

You see how much I know about motorcycles.

MR. RUSSELL:

Undoubtedly the 68 —

Yes. We'd stipulate to one

each on those.

16

MS. DONOVAN:

17

THE COURT:

That's correct.
It would be my guess to give each

18

of you one, but if they are that old —

19

trail bikes?

They are little

I think $50.00 figure is pretty close.

20

MR. RUSSELL:

21

THE COURT:

Thank you, Your Honor.
Now, there's —

you've got a

22

Honda 80, here again it's a small trail bike, $125.00.

23

I've got another Honda 75, and I assume that's a little

24

street bike.

25

MR. FINLAYSON:

Same as the other one.
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1

MS. DONOVAN:

2

THE COURT:

3

MS. DONOVAN:

4

Down to the '78 Honda 75 ccs.

THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. RUSSELL:

8

THE COURT:

Yes, Your Honor.
Two thousand five hundred.

Have

you got something else you want to value?

10
11

Now, you're down to your

boat.

7

9

We've both listed that at

fifty.

5
6

We both have that as $50.00.

MS. DONOVAN:

We have some other accounts,

stock accounts, Equity Trust account.

12

THE COURT:

If they are stock accounts,

13

we'll just look at the last quote on it.

14

listed on any board —

15

If they are

are they?

MR. RUSSELL:

Yes, they are listed, Your

16

Honor. We might suggest a fifty fifty in kind

17

distribution on it.

18

THE COURT:

That would be the general goal,

19

except you're going to have to be even on the big bottom

20

pictures.

21

So, whatever the newspaper says they are worth.

22

Wall Street Journal says they are worth today is what

23

they are worth.

24

the Wall Street Journal somewhere?

25

All I'll do is go and look at the newspaper.

Is that clear?

MS. DONOVAN:

What the

Do they all appear in

I'm sure they do, or they have
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1

the most current statements.

2

theory those should be divided equally subject to the

3

bottom line on the other assets?

4

THE COURT:

Yes.

So you're saying that in

You realize when I get close

5

to the bottom line I have to start making people take

6

things, maybe.

But the real real bottom line is cash.

7

MS. DONOVAN:

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. RUSSELL:

10
11
12
13

You understand that?
Yes, Your Honor.
Now these policies, what do you

THE COURT:
each say about those?

Which policies, Your Honor?

MS. DONOVAN:
The life, USA policy?

14

THE COURT:

15

MS. DONOVAN:

16

Right.

Yes
We had proposed, I think that

at least one, they be divided equally.

17

MR. RUSSELL:

Yeah, ours.

18

MS. DONOVAN:

Yeah.

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. RUSSELL:

I don't even know, Judge.

21

MS. DONOVAN:

Our understanding is you can,

22
23
24
25

Can you split ownership?

Your Honor.
We would suggest that both of

MR. RUSSELL:
them be split.
THE COURT:

If you can't, you're going to end
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1

up flipping coins.

2

collection, the only thing I can do is make you bring it

3

into court, or some place, and start picking up coins.

4
5

MS. DONOVAN:

I'm amazed at the high value

placed on it.
MS. DONOVAN:

She called and asked them what

going memberships were, and that's what they told her.

10
11

Camper World membership, Your

THE COURT:

8
9

THE COURT:

They must have paid a whole lot

less than that.

12

MR. RUSSELL:

13

MS. FINLAYSON:

14

MR. RUSSELL:

Less $4,000 would be our

MS. DONOVAN:

Her proffer would be they paid

around seven.

19
20

I think we paid $7,000 for

proffer.

17
18

Several thousand dollars less.

it.

15
16

This coin

Honor?

6
7

That's the bottom line.

MS. FINLAYSON:

I don't have the papers;

Roger does.

21

THE COURT:

Put it down on the choice on the

22

person who gets it, gets it for four thousand five

23

hundred.

24

agree on it. The gun collection we've talked about.

25

tools we've talked about.

Divide the coins coin at a time, unless you
The

The dolls we talked about. I
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1

take it the various accounts are worth what they say they

2

are.

What about the big vault?

3

MS. DONOVAN:

We listed it at twelve hundred.

4

MR. RUSSELL:

We proposed, Your Honor, that

5

that be one of the items to be divided, along with the

6

fireplace insert, utility trailer, cement mixer, riding

7

lawnmower, mulcher, snowblower, canoe.

8

personal property at this point.

9
10

THE COURT:

We're into small

You can work on that out on your

picnic,

11

MR. RUSSELL:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. RUSSELL:

Yes, Your Honor.
Anything else?
Your Honor, I had a few matters

14

of clarification.

15

awarding monthly child support as per the stipulated

16

guideline sheet, Your Honor?

17
18
19
20

The first one is that the court is

THE COURT:
each.

That's true.

I think that's the figure you used; isn't it?
MS. DONOVAN:

No.

It was based upon actual

earnings of about $300.00 a month each.

21

THE COURT:

22

MS, DONOVAN :

23

Minimum wage for

Let's see, minimum wage —
It's around seven hundred a

month, Your Honor.

24

MR. RUSSELL :

25

THE COURT:

That's historical figures.
I think they should each be
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1

charged with minimum wage.

2
3

MR. RUSSELL:

For the purposes of alimony, or

child support?

4

THE COURT:

Both.

I think they are equal as

5

far as earning capacity.

6

more schooled, but his health isn't as good and her.

7

think they are about —

8

should come close to the same.

9
10

She's less schooled, but he's
I

between now and death, they

MR. RUSSELL:

I understand the court's

ruling, Your Honor.

11

MS. DONOVAN:

Bill, do you have some other

13

MR. RUSSELL:

No.

14

MS. DONOVAN:

Your Honor, are you going to

15

order any counseling for Trisha?

12

questions?

16

THE COURT:

If you —

if one side or another

17

will fine a counselor who's willing to work with her, the

18

court will order counseling, and require each to pay

19

half.

20

MS. DONOVAN:

21

THE COURT:

Just so I'm clear

~

But it would have to be a

22

counselor of some repute.

I don't want to send her to

23

just anybody.

24

and this type of thing.

25

they usually accomplish something.

Get somebody that's worked with children,
There are people who do it. And
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1

MS. DONOVAN:

Your Honor, if I understand

2

your ruling, I believe you're saying that you are —

3

regard to the Hallmark Card Shop, you're recognizing that

4

original fourteen thousand dollar debt to Mrs. Finlayson

5

with simple interest at the rate of $841.51 per

6

THE COURT:

7

MS. DONOVAN:

with

—

I think that's six percent.
If those figures are accurate,

8

I did some rough figures, over the last twenty-seven

9

years the total of that would be close to thirty-six

10

$37,000 total obligation.

11

THE COURT:

12

MS. DONOVAN:

—

She's received $67,000.
I know this.
It appears there's an over-

13

payment then to her.

14

not quite sure how we're to deal with that.

15

of the other money considered marital money to be divided

16

equally?

17

Are you saying, then, that —

THE COURT:

Yes.

any greater than what I've said.

19

MS. DONOVAN:

21

Is the rest

I don't think that debt is

18

20

I'm

So it appears there's been an

over-payment, and funds should be coming back.
THE COURT:

Not necessarily, because I don't

22

know whether he paid that money on that debt, or whether

23

he paid it on the rent debt.

24

paid -- what he paid the money --

25

MR. RUSSELL:

I don't know whether he

That also begs the inquiry that
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1

we have to have a finding on an amount that she withdrew

2

from the account, which is our last entry,

3
4

THE COURT:

I believe there's no dispute on

it; is there?

5

MS, DONOVAN:

It was the $25,000 figure,

6

MR. RUSSELL:

Thirty-five thousand.

7

MS. DONOVAN:

It wasn't thirty-five.

There

8

was a withdrawal of twenty-five thousand on here.

9

only withdrawal he shows on his exhibit, 25,988.89.

10

MR. RUSSELL:

The

It's not on -- that exhibit is

11

not a model of clarity.

12

show that she did an actual withdrawal of about $35,000,

13

overdrafted the account by $9,500.

14
15

MS. DONOVAN:

I believe the bank record will

There's no evidence of that.

Those statements that were submitted into evidence —

16

THE COURT:

I can go through those, and go

17

back through the evidence unless you just want to draw an

18

inquiry.

19

with attorneys' fees over it.

20

institution, they'll tell you what was withdrawn.

21
22
23
24
25

There's no sense in having a court hearing this

MS. DONOVAN:

If you checked with the

Just so I'm clear, then, Your

Honor, my client —
THE COURT:

It's my impression that she drew

about thirty-five, but I might be wrong.
MS. DONOVAN:

But there's no record, other
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1

than what he says.

There's no bank statement or anything

2

else.

3

saying, whatever was in that account should be divided

4

equally less whatever she withdrew?

I'm sure we can get the record on that.

5

THE COURT:

6

MS. DONOVAN:

7
8
9
10

And he withdrew.
All of that is a fifty fifty

division; correct?
THE COURT:

That's true.

MS. DONOVAN:

If he's overpaid his mother,

then my client gets a credit?

12

THE COURT:

14

Only subject to

the bottom line.

11

13

Are you

This is true.

If he's used some

of his share to pay his mother, that's his problem.
MS. DONOVAN:

On the lot, I understand your

15

ruling to say that that lot, even though it was in both

16

of their names, is not marital property?

17

THE COURT:

I think —

in the first place, I

18

think it's a trustee.

19

he is not a trustee.

20

he's in there on an early inheritance.

21

And the second place, I think that
His only involvement would be that

MS. DONOVAN:

There was testimony that they

22

would be given any credit for taxes that they made over

23

the years. Are you going to order that that happen?

24
25

THE COURT:

That's the -- you realize that

when you get involved in those taxes and that kind of
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1

thing, you might have to face her.

2

goes and files a lawsuit tomorrow, this might change this

3

whole thing for her.

4

she's still here, and we're going to have to deal with

5

her if she comes.

6

The ninety-three year old mother,

MS. DONOVAN:

7

taxes?

8

it, and be reimbursed.
THE COURT:
on this.

I don't know why you're excited

How much are the taxes on a vacant lot?

11
12

So what are you saying on the

Her testimony was that they were going to arrange

9
10

If defense counsel

MS. DONOVAN:
fifteen years or so.

They've been paying them for

Five hundred a year.

13

MR. RUSSELL:

I've got it right here.

14

MR. RUSSELL:

407, 414. Eight hundred for

15

two years. No, that's not it.

16
17

MS. DONOVAN:

It could be $6,000 for the last

few years.

18

THE COURT:

He's going to have to settle that

19

with his mother.

20

concerned, no.

21

some —

22

year in which it was paid, and it's no longer —

23

makes out with his mother is another problem.

24

believe that the taxes are that high on a vacant lot.

25

I think as far as his credit is

Don't give credit for it now.

It was

if that was given away, it was given away the

MS. DONOVAN:

How he

I can't

We have the receipts for it.
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So you're saying there would be no credit?

2

MS. DONOVAN:

3

THE COURT:

4

MS. DONOVAN:

5

That was given away years ago.
Are you making any order on

attorney's fees, Your Honor?

6

THE COURT:

7

MS. DONOVAN:

8

THE COURT:

9

That's true.

Yes.

But are you ready for that?

Yes.

Basically, I think the parties both

have assets, and under the series of Utah cases have

10

recourse to pay their own attorneys.

11

there has been unnecessary proceedings brought on by the

12

failure to let her see the child, and this type of thing,

13

so that he must make a contribution of $500.00 to her

14

fees because of those items.

15

than that, they both have funds they can pay their own

16

way.

17
18
19

MS. DONOVAN:

Court believes that

But that is all.

Other

Are you making any order on

contempt, Your Honor?
THE COURT:

I can not find any contempt on

20

the evidence I've received here.

21

of wisdom in some respects, but I cannot say contempt.

22

MS. DONOVAN:

23

visitation schedule, Your Honor?

24
25

THE COURT:

I think he's shown lack

Are you making a specific

No, because I'm not sure —

do so if it's necessary to talk to the girl.
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1 I

suggest that you stipulate that you have her appear

2

before one of the commissioners, and let the Commissioner

3

set it. Now, Judge Peuler, did he see her at all, or did

4

he just talk with her?

5

MS. DONOVAN:

6

Commissioner Peuler spoke with

her and one of the other children, yes.

7

THE COURT:

I would suggest that I transfer

8

that back to see if you can settle it before a

9

Commissioner.

10

I think the more you involve that girl in

coming into court, the bigger a mistake you'll make.

11

MS. DONOVAN:

Your Honor, just so I'm clear

12

on what we're doing, it appears that you've placed

13

certain values on these items, and after we go out and

14

have our picnic, as you call it, and figure out who gets

15

what with these certain values, we'll come down to the

16

the bottom line then, and determine if one or the other

17

owes the other money?

18
19

THE COURT:

That's true.

Not owe money, they

owe —

20

MS. DONOVAN:

21

THE COURT:

Credit?
There's going to be money coming

22

out of the house.

Plaintiff's attorney has one week to

23

draft the papers, and get them over to defense attorney

24

for approval as to form.

25

gets one week.

If she doesn't do it, then he
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MS. DONOVAN:

1
2

then he'll have to do it.
MR. RUSSELL:

3
4

I object to that, Your Honor.

I don't object to that, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

5
6

Maybe I should wait a week,

Sometimes you like to control

things.

7

MR. RUSSELL:

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. RUSSELL:

Nothing at this time.

10

MS. DONOVAN:

I don't think so, Your Honor.

11

THE COURT:

That's fine
Is there anything else?

Let me say this to the two

12

parents.

13

married, I think you probably had high hopes for

14

everything.

15

still decent people.

16

waged war on one another now with the intensity with

17

which you both wage it.

18

to me.

19

try the best I could not to wage war through the child.

20

My guess is she's terribly torn.

21

Judge thirty-five years, but I can tell you one thing for

22

sure, that is it doesn't matter whether it's true or not

23

true, if you tell a child that s he was sired by some kind

24

of a fiend, ishe won't love you f or it.

25

tell a child that her mother was an animal, she won't

You're both decent people, and when you got

I think this is true.

I think today you're

I don't know what happened, why you

The evidence doesn't disclose it

There may be good reasons for it.

But I would

I have only been a

And if you try to
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1

love you for it.

2

your life, I suggest you do now, because that's the only

3

hope you've got.

4

their parent are merciless.

5

say why did you pick him to be my father, and vice versa.

6

You almost have to say kind things, even if you have to

7

leave something unsaid.

8

If you ever pulled a few white lies in

Otherwise, nobody likes to be told that
You tell her that, they'll

Is there any other questions?

9

MR. RUSSELL:

Nothing further, Your Honor.

10

MS. DONOVAN:

No, Your Honor.

11 I

THE COURT:

Court is in recess.

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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WILLIAM R. RUSSELL (2833)
Attorney for Defendant
8 East Broadway, Suite 213
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-4600
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
(THIRD PROPOSED)

ARVILLA FINALYSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 904905062
Judge Timothy R. Hanson
(Tried by Judge Wahlquist)

ROGER FINLAYSON,
Defendant.

This matter was tried to the Court on October 17 and
18, 1991, after the parties stipulated to certain matters on the
record.

Plaintiff

and

Defendant

were

both

present

represented by counsel of record, Sharon A. Donovan
Plaintiff and William R. Russell for the Defendant.

and

for the

Both parties

presented evidence and argument, whereupon the Court entered its
ruling upon the record in open Court, and after which the parties
entered into stipulations as to the division of numerous items of
minor personal property not specifically awarded by the Court.
Defendant's counsel drafted proposed Findings, Conclusions, and a
Decree of Divorce, which were served by personal delivery upon
Plaintiff's

counsel

on

December

10,

1991.

Thereafter,

Plaintiff's counsel timely filed an Objection to the form of the
same.

Defendant's counsel prepared

Conclusions,

and

Decree,

Second Proposed Findings,

incorporating

A-34
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requested

in said Objection, and a hearing was held

on the

remaining objections on February 21, 1992, after which the Court
ordered changes and additional language.
Based upon these proceedings, and for good cause shown,
the Court makes and enters the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff and Defendant are residents of Salt Lake

County, Utah, and had been such for more than

three months

immediately prior to the filing of the Complaint herein.
2.

Plaintiff and Defendant were married on September

4, 1964 and since that time lived in the marital home until their
separation

on

about

December

21, 1990.

Prior

to

physical

separation, the parties ceased to live as husband and wife but
continued to occupy the same dwelling.
3.

The parties are parents of several children, but

only one has not yet attained the age of majority:

Trisha

Finlayson, age 15. No other children are expected.
4.

Both parties are fit and proper persons to be

awarded the legal custody of the minor child, Trisha Finlayson,
and joint legal custody

is appropriate.

interests

that

physical

of

the

custody.

child

Defendant

Plaintiff

should

It is in the best
be

be

awarded
allowed

her

sole

reasonable

visitation, as set forth in and in accordance with the standard
visitation schedule promulgated by the Third District Court, a
copy of which is attached hereto.

The primary reason for the

Court's ruling is the obvious choice of the daughter.

Her style

of living clearly indicates that for many reasons she is more
2
A 35

"

00150

closely bonded to the father as she prefers to eat meals with
him, watch television with him, and spend hours visiting with
him.

An unusual characteristic of this fifteen year old girl,

she is frightened
father's bed.

in the night, she goes and sleeps on her

I find no evidence of incest, and believe this is

the process of personal fear in the maturity of
Either

party

may

select

a qualified

family

the

child.

counsellor,

who

regularly works with children, to engage the minor child in
sessions relating to the separation and divorce, and continuing
relationships and visitation with her parents.

Each party shall

cooperate to schedule sessions, and each shall pay one-half of
reasonable counselling fees.
5.

Plaintiff should be ordered to pay monthly monetary

base child support to Defendant, in accordance with the Uniform
Support Guidelines.
party

is

In this regard, the Court finds that each

relatively

able-bodied,

has

employable

skills,

is

capable of presently obtaining and maintaining full-time minimum
wage

employment,

underemployed.

and

each

is

voluntarily

unemployed

or

As such each is attributed with minimum-wage,

full-time earnings in the amount of $731 gross per month, and the
same amount is hereby imputed.

In accordance with the previously

filed Worksheet, a copy of which is attached hereto, Plaintiff
should be ordered to pay to Defendant the sum of $102.50 as
monthly base child support.
6.

Both parties have engaged in employment since their

separation, Plaintiff is presently employed part-time, and the
Defendant is not presently employed.
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In light of the findings of

00

employability and the income imputed to each of them in paragraph
5 above, while both parties may be in need of some financial
support, neither party has the ability

to pay the same, and

accordingly no alimony should be awarded at this time.
7.

The parties have acquired an interest in real

property during the marriage, located at 4950 Highland Circle,
Salt Lake City, Utah, which is presently listed for sale with a
realtor.

It

is

reasonable

that

Defendant

be

awarded

the

exclusive use and occupancy of the home, to reside there with the
minor child, until December 31, 1991.

If the home has not been

sold by that date, Defendant shall be charged with a reasonable
rental amount, beginning for the month of January of 1992, which
is found to be $400 per month, as a deduction from the proceeds
of any eventual sale thereof, for each month he occupies the same
prior to sale.

Defendant shall make necessary repairs on the

home, while he resides there, as his abilities and resources
enable him to do so.

If the home remains unsold on June 30,

1992, Plaintiff may petition the Court for an Order requiring the
Defendant to vacate the home, upon a showing that the Defendant
has failed to take reasonable steps to promptly sell the home.
If the Court then grants said petition, Plaintiff may be allowed
to move back into the home and Plaintiff shall be charged with a
like $400 per month rental amount against her proceeds from the
eventual sale thereof.

The Court

finds

that

the

home

was

partially purchased with funds realized from the sale of the
Hallmark store, which was opened and operated by Defendant prior
to the marriage with funds borrowed from Defendant's parents.

4
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The Court further finds that except as to debt to Defendant's
mother set forth herein, the home and property are within the
marital

estate,

and

the

proceeds

thereof

shall

be

divided

equally, but subject to adjustment to repayment of that loan and
to awards therefrom to equalize the distribution of the entire
marital estate.
8.

The parties maintained a joint savings account at

Zions Bank in 1990. Prior to the date this action was commenced,
Defendant

withdrew

therefrom

and

paid

Finlayson, the total sum of $57,285.03.

to

his

mother,

Mina

These payments were made

to repay the note due to Defendant's parents to open the Hallmark
store, as more fully described in Finding paragraph 13, below.
From the testimony at trial, the Court finds that Plaintiff knew
of the nature

and basis

of

this

obligation,

and

urged

the

Defendant repeatedly throughout the marriage to repay the same.
The Defendant's father obviously wished to hold control of the
store and therefore required the signing of the note.

This may

have been partly to protect against creditors, or the weakness of
the son.

This was frequently discussed over the last few years.

The Court cannot force the son to plead the affirmative defense
of statute of limitations against his mother.

Therefore, in

justice and equity, the Defendant's mother holds a lien against
the property, and should receive payment of that note.

Up to

date, monies paid to Mina Finlayson came from the sale of the
store.

Monies

owed

on

the

other

note

are

a marital

debt

controlled by these findings.
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9.

In late 1990, Plaintiff withdrew the total sum of

$35,488.89 from the joint savings account, which she used for her
separate purposes.

Plaintiff is awarded said sum as a separate

award of marital property.

Defendant is awarded his withdrawals

partially as a separate award of marital property and partially
as joint marital funds to pay joint marital obligations, to the
extent set forth in Finding paragraph 13 below.
therefore

receive

as

a

separate

award

Defendant should

the

remainder

of

withdrawals, less payment of marital obligations, resulting in
net separate awards to Defendant of $16,731.29, and to Plaintiff
in the amount of $35,488.89.
10.

Each party should be ordered to pay any separate

debts incurred in their own name, or as assigned herein, holding
the other party harmless therefrom.
11.

The parties have acquired interests in thousands

of items of personal property during the marriage.

The Court

attempts to assign values and award distributions on only the
larger

items, and subject to a reconciliation of the entire

marital estate to achieve equal
awarded all of the

distribution.

Plaintiff

is

"Precious Moments" dolls, at a value of

$1,000, and the Defendant is awarded all of the tools in the
garage, at a value of $1,000.

The parties1 child(ren) may have

some asserted interest in the tools but the Court awards them to
Defendant subject to any interest the child(ren) may have, and
Defendant alone shall account to said child(ren) for the delivery
of said promised or gifted tools.

Plaintiff is awarded the Honda

Accord automobile and the Defendant is awarded the Jeep Wagoneer,
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each at a value of $7,4 50.
Honda 75cc motorcycles.

Each party is awarded one of the two

Each party shall receive one-half of the

present interest in the Commonwealth

Equity

Trust

fund, the

Putnam Fund, the proceeds from the failed Thrift liquidators, the
USA Life Insurance policy, and the Utah Power stock, which now is
owned by PacifiCorp.

The Court finds that all of the above items

of personal property, as awarded are approximately equal and an
equitable division thereof.

It would be ridiculous for the Court

to litigate the division of each one of their assets, and would
consume hundreds of hours.
their value.
Fact,

some

The attorney's

fees would exceed

At the time of the last conference on Findings of
division

had

occurred.

division made by agreement.

The

Court

approves

the

The basic order was that the bailiff

would throw a coin to determine which person had first choice of
the first item, and they would alternate those materials.

The

Court will apply this division method to the remaining assets as
the only economic way to divide what may be hundreds more items.
12o

The Court finds that during the marriage (in 19 78)

Mina Finlayson, the Defendant's mother, and/or a trust related to
her, deeded real property located at 4946 Highland Circle, Salt
Lake City, Utah, jointly to the parties, which deed was duly
delivered and recorded.

Said property is a vacant lot located

adjacent to the marital home, and was owned by Mina Finlayson
with her husband, who had died prior to the transfer of record
title.

From the testimony of Mina Finlayson and other witnesses

at trial, the Court finds that Mina had, at the time of the
transfer to the parties, decided to sell the property and as a
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result, deeded the property

to

the parties

as trustees, to

maintain and attempt to sell the property for her.

The Court

further finds that said transfer was without donative intent,
that no equitable interest passed to the parties, and that Minafs
intent was solely to allow the parties to act as her agents in
maintaining and selling the lot.

Marital funds were used to pay

the property taxes for such parcel as they

came

due.

The

Defendant did not request reimbursement for the taxes from his
mother because of the two note obligations owed to her (more
fully

described

in Finding

paragraph

13, below)

substantial nature and had not yet been repaid.

were

of

a

All dealings

with the property have occurred since the marriage.

There has

been perhaps six thousand dollars paid in taxes, but there has no
interest paid on any other debt.
wash.

The Court regards this as a

As such, the Court finds that said real property is not

within the marital estate.

Each of the parties should be ordered

to execute a Quit-Claim deed in favor of Mina Finlayson, her
successor, or her designated agent.
13.

Prior to the marriage, Defendant borrowed funds,

in the amount of $14,800.84, from his parents to open a Hallmark
store in the Cottonwood Mall, which was operated by Defendant
prior to the marriage and by both parties during the marriage,
and was later sold during the marriage.

Said obligation was

evidenced by a written promissory note, dated September 4, 19 62
with stated

interest of 6% per cent per annum, but

reference to simple or compound interest.
both

parties

substantially

contributed
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success of the business, the

Court

finds

that

although

the

business and its proceeds were in large part marital property,
equity requires that the originally borrowed

set-up funds be

repaid by the parties from marital assets. The Court also finds
that without this loan from Defendant's parents, the parties
would not have had the opportunity to engage in and build the
business, and reap its benefits.

Thus, Defendant's repayment of

funds to his mother in late 19 90 were properly paid by marital
funds held in a joint savings account.

The Court finds simple

interest to be applicable, and that interest accrued
amount

of

$888.03

per

year

for

29

years

($25,752.87

in the
total

interest through trial), which, added to the principal amount,
equals a total obligation of $40,553.74.
repayments on said note in 1990.

Defendant made several

Insofar as repayments made to

Mina Finlayson were made up to that amount, they are properly
paid with joint funds.

The separate note from Defendant to his

parents for rental amounts owed to them for marital housing
expenses is held unenforceable, and additional amounts paid to
Mina from joint marital funds shall be charged to Defendant as a
receipt of marital funds, which calculations are set forth in
Finding paragraph 8, above.
not fully disclosed

The Defendant's father, for reasons

in the evidence except by circumstantial

inference, wished to maintain control of the store and may or may
not have regarded it as a potential

asset owned by himself.

There is no fixed amount, but at the time the note was made, it
was intended to cover inventory, and readily determinable by the
parties, but held some possible dispute with creditors.

There

has been no payment on this amount, but it has been discussed
throughout the marriage by the parties.

The son should not be

forced to plead to the statute of limitations against his mother.
The mother holds a lien for that inventory
litigants.

as against these

The Court treats these two obligations differently

because the store loan is attributable to the creation of marital
property which the parties have enjoyed, but the rental loan
yielded no asset subject to division.

With reference to the

"monies for rent" note, this loan was made during the marriage,
with fixed interest at six percent.
that it would be paid.

It was intended eventually

There was no payment on it.

The statute

of limitations has run.

The wife has the right to plead the

statute of limitations.

In justice and equity, she should be

regarded as

free

of the

debt.

Payments

considered voluntary by Defendant, and

on

come

that

from

debt

are

his share.

Accordingly, Defendant alone shall be responsible to discharge
the note relating to housing expenses, holding the Plaintiff
harmless therefrom.
14.

In addition to the above distribution, the Court

finds the following values, and finds as equitable the following
additional awards of property to the party so designated:
TO PLAINTIFF

TO DEFENDANT

Savings Withdrawals
$35,488.89
1978 Pace Arrow Motor Home
$10,000.00

$16,731.29

Camperworld Membership
$4,500.00
Canoe

$300.00
A 43
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Guns

$1,000.00

1974 Dodge Van

$500.00

Gulfstream Boat

$2,500.00

Dune Buggy
TOTALS
From

$300.00

$50,288.89
the

above

$21,031.29

awards,

the

Court

finds

that

the

Plaintiff has received $29,257.60 more than Defendant from the
marital estate distribution.

The Court therefore finds that in

order to equalize the distribution of property, Defendant shall
first receive said deficiency amount, as his sole and separate
property and free from any claim of Plaintiff, less the $500
awarded to Plaintiff as attorney's fees in Finding paragraph 17
below, for a net amount of $28,757.60, from the net proceeds of
the eventual sale of the marital home. The remaining net proceeds
shall

be

divided

equally

between

Plaintiff

and

Defendant.

Plaintiff's counsel has recorded an attorneyfs lien against the
property

to

secure

payment

of

their

fees,

which

shall

be

satisfied from the remaining sale proceeds awarded to Plaintiff,
if the same has not then been paid, in the manner and priority
provided by law.
15.

It is reasonable that each party be granted as

their sole and separate property

their

personal

effects

and

belongings and any items they possessed before the marriage which
have not lost their individual character by comingling.
parties

shall go to the home, where many

items

of

The

personal

property are stored, and each shall remove any items that were
acquired before the marriage as their separate property.

The

remaining marital items shall be divided item by item, by lot or
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chance as to the first selection and alternating thereafter, and
Plaintiff

shall remove items so distributed

from

the house.

Family photographs shall also be divided, but each party shall
have the right to make reproductions thereof at that party's sole
expense.
16. No contempt of the Court's previous orders as to
either party has been shown, nor is the same found.
17.

Defendant should be ordered to pay Plaintiff's

attorney's fees in the sum of $500, and the same should be
awarded, due to legal expenses incurred in pursuing sale of the
home and other issues, as set forth in paragraph 14 above.
18.
differences

During the course of the marriage, irreconcilable
arose

between

the

parties, which

led

to

their

separation and have made continuation of the marital relationship
imposs ible.
19.
documents

or

The parties should be ordered to execute any
perform

any

acts

necessary

and

reasonable

to

effectuate the provisions of the Decree of Divorce.
20.

Each party should be ordered to pay one-half of

any uninsured medical expenses of the minor child.

Neither party

has health or medical insurance available at low or no cost at
this time, but if either becomes eligible to obtain the same,
each should be ordered to obtain the such insurance for the minor
child.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court
hereby enters the following
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This Court has jurisdiction over the parties and

subject matter of this action for Divorce.

Divorce,

2.

Grounds for Divorce exist under Utah law.

3.

Plaintiff is entitled to the entry of a Decree of

dissolving

the

state

of matrimony

existing

between

Plaintiff and Defendant, said Decree to contain all relevant
provisions of the Findings-and Conclusions set forth herein.
DATED this

/ /

day of March, 1992.
BY THE COU#T:

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
^^K4L*A^W*\ d •

SHARON A. DONOVAN
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

*-

day of March, 1992,

the original and a copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law (Third Proposed) was hand-delivered to:

Sharon A. Donovan
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING
310 South Main, #1300
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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WILLIAM R. RUSSELL (2833)
Attorney for Defendant
8 East Broadway, Suite 213
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-4600
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ARVILLA FINALYSON,
DECREE OF DIVORCE
(THIRD PROPOSED) .<->. _

Plaintiff,

^

vs.
Case No. 904905062
Judge Timothy R. Hanson
(Tried by Judge Wahlquist)

ROGER FINLAYSON,
Defendant.

Based

upon

the

stipulations

of

the

parties,

the

evidence at trial, and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law (Third Proposed) entered herein, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1.

Plaintiff is hereby awarded this Decree of Divorce,

dissolving the bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between the
Plaintiff

and

Defendant, upon

the

grounds

of

irreconcilable

differences, to become final upon entry hereof.
2.

Both parties are hereby awarded the joint legal

custody of the minor child, Trisha Finlayson.
hereby

awarded

her

sole

and

exclusive

Defendant is

physical

custody.

Plaintiff is granted reasonable visitation, as set forth in and
in accordance with the standard visitation schedule promulgated
by the Third District Court.

Either party may select a qualified
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family counsellor, who regularly works with children, to engage
the minor child in

sessions

relating

to the

separation

and

divorce, and continuing relationships and visitation with her
parents.

Each party shall cooperate to schedule sessions, and

each shall pay one-half of reasonable counselling fees.
3.

Plaintiff is ordered to pay monthly monetary base

child support to Defendant, in the amount of $102.50, which
amount is in accordance with the Uniform Support Guidelines.
4.

No alimony is awarded.

5.

Defendant is hereby awarded the exclusive use and

occupancy of the former marital home, located at 4950 Highland
Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah, to reside there with the minor
child, until December 31, 1991.

If the home has not been sold by

that date, Defendant shall be charged with a reasonable rental
amount, which is found to be $400 per month, as a deduction from
the proceeds of any eventual sale thereof, for each month he
occupies the same prior to sale.

Defendant shall make necessary

repairs on the home, while he resides there, as his abilities and
resources enable him to do so.

If the home remains unsold on

June 30, 1992, Plaintiff may petition the Court for an Order
requiring the Defendant to vacate the home, upon a showing that
the Defendant has failed to take reasonable steps to promptly
sell the home.

If the Court then grants said petition, Plaintiff

may be allowed to move back into the home and Plaintiff shall be
charged with a like $400 per month rental amount against her
proceeds from the eventual sale thereof.
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6.

The parties maintained a joint savings account at

Zions Bank in 1990. Prior to the date this action was commenced,
Defendant

withdrew

therefrom

and

paid

Finlayson, the total sum of $57,285.03-

to

his

mother,

Mina

These payments were made

to repay the note due to Defendant's parents to open the Hallmark
store, as more fully described below.

In late 1990, Plaintiff

withdrew the total sum of $35,488.89

from the joint savings

account, which she used for her separate purposes.
awarded

said

sum

as

a separate

award

of

Plaintiff is

marital

Defendant is awarded his withdrawals partially

property.

as a separate

award of marital property and partially as joint marital funds to
pay joint marital obligations.

Defendant is therefore credited

as a separate award the remainder of withdrawals, less payment of
marital

obligations,

resulting

Defendant of $16,731.29, and

in

net

separate

to Plaintiff

in the

awards

to

amount of

$35,488.89 from this account.
7.

Each party is ordered to pay any separate debts

incurred in their own name, or as assigned herein, holding the
other party harmless therefrom.
8.

The parties have acquired interests in thousands of

items of personal property

during

the marriage.

The Court

attempts to assign values and award distributions on only the
larger items, and subject to a reconciliation of the entire
marital estate to achieve equal
awarded all of the

distribution.

Plaintiff

is

"Precious Moments" dolls, at a value of

$1,000, and the Defendant is awarded all of the tools in the
garage, at a value of $1,000.
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The parties1 child(ren) may have some asserted interest in the
tools but the Court awards them to Defendant
interest the child(ren) may have, and

subject to any

Defendant

alone

shall

account to said child(ren) for the delivery of said promised or
gifted tools.

Plaintiff is awarded the Honda Accord automobile

and the Defendant is awarded the Jeep Wagoneer, each at a value
of $7,4 50,

Each party is awarded one of the two Honda 75cc

motorcycles.

Each party shall receive one-half of the present

interest in the Commonwealth Equity Trust fund, the Putnam Fund,
the proceeds from the failed Thrift liquidators, the USA Life
Insurance policy, and the Utah Power stock, which now is owned by
PacifiCorp.

The Court finds that all of the above items of

personal property, as awarded
equitable division thereof.

are approximately
The

Court

approves

equal and an
the parties

division of household items as previously stuipulated, ordered
and effectuated:,
9.

Both parties are ordered to forthwith execute a

quit-claim deed for the real property located at 494 6 Highland
Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah to Mina Finlayson, her successor, or
her designated agent.
10.

Prior to the marriage, Defendant borrowed funds,

in the amount of $14,800.84, from his parents to open a Hallmark
store in the Cottonwood Mall, which was operated by Defendant
prior to the marriage and by both parties during the marriage,
and was later sold during the marriage.

Said obligation was

evidenced by a written promissory note, dated September 4, 19 62
with stated

interest of 6% per cent per annum,
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but

without

00165

reference to simple or compound interest.
both parties

substantially

contributed

success of the business, the Court

While the Court finds
to the operation

finds

that

and

although

the

business and its proceeds were in large part marital property,
equity requires that the originally borrowed

set-up funds be

repaid by the parties from marital assets. The Court also finds
that without this loan from Defendant's parents, the parties
would not have had the opportunity to engage in and build the
business, and reap its benefits.

Thus, Defendant's repayment of

funds to his mother in late 1990 were properly paid by marital
funds held in a joint savings account.

The Court rules simple

interest to be applicable, and that interest accrued in the
amount

of

$888.03

per

year

for

29

years

($25,752.87

total

interest through trial), which, added to the principal amount,
equals a total obligation of $40,553.74.
repayments on said note in 1990.

Defendant made several

Insofar as repayments made to

Mina Finlayson were made up to that amount, they are held to be
marital debts properly paid with joint funds.

The separate note

from Defendant to his parents for rental amounts owed to them for
marital housing expenses is held unenforceable, and additional
amounts paid to Mina from joint marital funds shall be charged to
Defendant as a receipt of marital funds, which calculations are
set forth in paragraph 6, above.

The Court treats these two

obligations differently because the store loan is attributable to
the creation of marital property which the parties have enjoyed,
but the rental loan yielded no asset subject to division.

The

Court further treats the "monies for rent note differently for
A
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the additional reasons set forth in the Findings of Fact (Third
Proposed), heretofore entered, and upon which this decree is
based.

Accordingly, Defendant alone shall be responsible to

discharge the note relating to housing expenses, holding the
Plaintiff harmless therefrom.
11.

In addition to the above distribution, the Court

finds the following values, and equitably awards the following
property to the party so designated:
PLAINTIFF

DEFENDANT

Savings Withdrawals
$35,488.89

$16,731.29

19 78 Pace Arrow Motor Home
$10,000.00
Camperworld Membership
$4,500.00
Canoe

$300.00
Guns

$1,000.00

1974 Dodge Van

$500.00

Gulfstream Boat

$2,500.00

Dune Buggy
TOTALS
From

$300.00

$50,288.89
the

above

$21,031.2 9

awards,

the

Court

finds

that

the

Plaintiff has received $29,257.60 more than Defendant from the
marital estate distribution.

The Court therefore orders, in

order to equalize the distribution of property, that Defendant
shall

first

receive

said

amount, as his

sole

and

separate

property and free from any claim of Plaintiff, less the $500
awarded to Plaintiff as attorneyfs fees in paragraph 14 below,
for a net amount of $28,757.60, from the net proceeds of the

A 52
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eventual sale of the marital home, after which the remaining net
proceeds

shall

Defendant.

be

divided

equally

between

Plaintiff

and

Plaintiff's counsel has recorded an attorney's lien

against the property to secure payment of their fees, which shall
be

satisfied

from

the

remaining

sale

proceeds

awarded

to

Plaintiff, if the same has not then been paid, in the manner and
priority provided by law.
12.

Each party is awarded as their sole and separate

property their personal effects and belongings and any items they
possessed

before

the

marriage

which

individual character by comingling.

have

not

lost

their

The parties shall go to the

home, where many items of personal property are stored, and each
shall remove any items that were acquired before the marriage as
their separate property.

The remaining marital items shall be

divided item by item, by lot or chance as to the first selection
and alternating thereafter, and Plaintiff shall remove items so
distributed from the house.
divided,

but

each

party

Family photographs shall also be
shall

have

the

right

to

make

reproductions thereof at that party's sole expense.
13. No contempt of the Court's previous orders as to
either party has been shown, and no citation thereof is entered.
14.

Defendant is ordered to pay Plaintiff's attorney's

fees in the sum of $500, and the same should be awarded, due to
legal expenses incurred in pursuing sale of the home and other
issues, to be paid as set forth in paragraph 11 above.
15.

The parties are ordered to execute any documents

or perform any acts necessary and reasonable to effectuate the
provisions of this Decree of Divorce.

A-53
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16 o

Each party is ordered to pay one-half of any

uninsured medical expenses of the minor child.

Neither party has

health or medical insurance available at low or no cost at this
time, but if either becomes eligible to obtain the same, each is
ordered to obtain such insurance for the minor child.
DATED this

/ 7

day of March, 1992.
BY THE COLmT:

JOHN F. -WAHLQUIST
Senior District Judg
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
^M^rA^J;
SHARON A. DONOVAN
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
^

^

. _. . _

2

y\CA

day of March, 199 2,

a copy of the foregoing Decree of Divorce (Third Proposed) was
hand-delivered to:

Sharon A. Donovan
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING
310 South Main, #1300
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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Third Jud'Ctal District

MAY 1 9 1992
.lL**cC0'jr4TY
By

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM DECISION

ARVILLA FINLAYSON,

CIVIL NO. 904905062 DA

Plaintiff,

JUDGE JOHN F. WAHLQUIST

vs.
ROGER FINLAYSON,
Defendant.

I will comment on the major points referred to in the briefs
concerning the motions for a new trial.
SLEEPING JUDGE ISSUE
I was a judge in my youth.
youngest.

For fifteen years

I was Utah's

An older judge (Judge Ellett) , told me that if I lived

long enough I, too, would be stereotyped as a sleeping judge.

He

predicted it would first occur in an ugly divorce contest where £#
one could possibly enjoy "20 winks11.

He predicted that endless

insults would be hurled back and forth.

(See plaintiff's and

defendant's recent affidavits alleging misconduct of each other.)
I have lived long enough to enjoy this stereotyping as an old
judge.
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It is not only old judges who pick up this stereotyping.
Washington

columnist

President

Reagan

interrupting.

pointed

would

out

look

that
down

and

presentations

listen

without

One or more disappointed people in the back of

the room always accused

him of sleeping.

I do not recall sleeping on this case.
bored.

during

A

In fact, I was never

I was constantly perplexed and asking myself why the

attorneys and witnesses were saying what was being said.

I have

now asked myself how would a judge know if he had dozed.

He

might later discover that he missed something or not be prepared
to rule immediately.

I experienced none of these things.

believed that I suffered the entire ordeal.
vented.

The

I

The courtroom was

contest was joined, but there was very

little

conflict in the testimony on the major issues.

GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE
Irreconcilable differences were clearly evident.

In fact,

for a long time the husband lived in his bedroom, complete with
refrigerator, television sets, etc.
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CUSTODY OF CHILD
The only minor child is a 15 year old girl.

She was never a

witness, but the parties agreed that if she were forced to be a
witness, she would choose to live with her father.

Her older

brother did testify and implied that his sister would run away
if custody were awarded to the mother.

This 15 year old girl

was described in the testimony as a frightened, immature, and
insecure girl.

She was plagued by sleep disturbances and would

arise in the night to climb in bed with the father and mother.
In later years this habit continued, and eventually her parents
slept in different beds in different rooms.
her father's room and slept on his bed.

She then went to

The mother's attorney

argues the father must be driven from the home to put an end to
this strange behavior.
Court of incest.

There was no evidence presented to the

The mother knew that this behavior continued

while she was in the home.
The Court has certainly meditated on this matter and finds
it is innocent.

This testimony has played a part in leaving the

father and the daughter in the home during the sale period,
which the Court had hoped would be brief.

Another phase of the

problem is, "Why is the daughter completely alienated from the
mother?11
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WORK HISTORY AND THE STORE
The basic facts are not an issue.

The husband had been

married previously and between the prior marriage and the one in
court

had

worked

as

a

carpenter.

He

construction of a large Salt Lake mall.
good.

His

father

wanted

to

help

was

employed

on

the

His health was not very
him

so

he

advanced

approximately $14,000.00 to purchase the inventory for a gift
store, and the son secured a lease for space in the mall.

The

father was obviously worried about losing the money if the new
venture failed so he wrote out a note, which was signed by the
son, wherein the son promised to repay the money to the father
for all inventory bought with the $14,000.00 at 6% interest; and
also purports to grant the father a first lien to be ahead of
all

other

operating
plaintiff.

creditors.
the

gift

The

defendant, who

store

business

when

was
he

the

son, was

courted

the

This signed note was the property of the defendant7s

mother when the store was sold.

The defendant, who was the son,

paid off the note to his mother, as the father was dead at the
time the store was sold.

The couple kept the large profit and

the Court has considered the profit to be marital property.
This note is written in the handwriting of the father, who
has been dead for many years.

the son testified that he and his
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wife discussed the origin of the store many times, and she had
urged him to repay the debt over the years.

The defendant's

parents also helped the couple financially in other ways.
This store was the only substantial source of income during
the marriage and both spent their working days there throughout
the marriage.

The Court certainly finds that the origin of the

store had been freely discussed.

It is in a legal sense a

callable note because the $14,000.00 figure was determinable by
purchase

receipts,

etc.

The

lien

that

it

certainly be ahead of the store owner's share.

reserved

would

This payment,

both morally and legally was proper.

NOTE FOR THE RENT OF THE APARTMENT
Early

in

the

parties7

marriage

the

defendant's

parents

provided them with an apartment for a lengthy period of time.

A

note was signed, but no payment was ever made on it.

The

defendant wants to pay the debt to his elderly mother.

The

plaintiff points out that the note is unenforceable because the
statute of limitation has run.

The Court has ruled that the

plaintiff may assert this defense against her ex-mother-in-law.
Of course, the son may repay this note from his personal share
if

he

wishes

to

ease

his

conscience.
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She appears as a refined woman and was

etc.,

but

appeared

older

than

her

chronological age, which is considerable.

LOT NEXT DOOR
The plaintiff and the defendant purchased a home early in
their marriage.

The defendant's parents bought a lot next to

this home, on which they planned to build a home in order to be
close to the son.

The defendant's father died and the mother

eventually decided not to build on this lot.

Both the defendant

and his mother have testified that they discussed the sale of
the lot.

The defendant's mother decided she would deed the lot

to the son so he could look after it and put it up for sale.
Both testified that the deed was made out to him and his wife as
was the

custom

in those days, delivered

and

recorded.

The

defendant testifies that he never got around to carrying out the
intent.
not

In fact the evidence was strong that he frequently did

carry

out

intentions...his

or

other

people's,

example, the sale of the house as ordered by the Court.

as

for

It must

be remembered that the only work history of this couple is the
tending of the gift card store.
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The plaintiff testified that the transaction involving the
lot occurred between the mother and the sonownership rights on two bases.
and recorded.

She maintains her

First, the deed was delivered

Second, that each year when the taxes came due,

the defendant paid the tax from the couple's joint property.
The

Court

has

considered

the

fact

that

the

defendant

has

siblings and may have intended to hold the property until

his

mother died; but the defendant's mother appeared to the Court to
be an extremely credible witness, and her testimony that is
rebutted at most by the delivery of the deed, is believed.

ALIMONY
The defendant's appearance in Court and the manner in which
he moves would lead to a gross over-estimation of his age.

The

Court can see no chance of high earnings, but he might be
employable as a bookkeeper or store clerk at a low wage level.
The plaintiff's appearance is consistent with her age.

Her

only employment, in addition to clerking at the gift store, is
with

the

Deseret

Industry.

These

facts

coupled

with

her

appearance as a witness convinced the Court that her employment
possibility is in the low wage range.

She has been ordered to

pay child support in accordance with the tables.
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It is obvious that neither party is in a position to pay
alimony

from

present

earnings,

while

both

could

probably

establish a need,

PERSONAL PROPERTY AND HOME
The parties prospered while running the gift store.
have

accumulated

more

than

the

average

couple.

While

They
they

received some financial support from the defendant's parents,
their

income

in

the

past

has

exceeded

their

expenditures.

However, if their litigation continues their assets will be used
up in attorneys fees.

The Court has attempted to divide their

personal property equally.

This includes insurance accounts,

stocks, etc.
There
isolated

is a small
matter.

Both

sum awarded
parties

as attorney's

could

pay

a

fees for an

normal

fee

for

attorneys, but neither can afford what is occurring.
The biggest remaining asset is their home.

The Court has

considered it marital property and attempted to force a sale.
The only reason defendant was given the first opportunity to
sell was to provide the insecure 15 year old girl with familiar
surroundings for a short adjustment period.

If the sale process

has broken down as indicated by some of the newer conflicting
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affidavits, it is possible that there will have to be a new
adjustment in that the sale may not be occurring as planned.
This involves events since the trial, but does not change the
ruling of the 50/50 split.

It may be necessary to appoint a

master to force sale of the home.
The Court endeavored to divide the major personal items.
Each party was awarded a car, approximately equal in value.
wife got the mobile home.

The

The wife received the doll collection

valued by the parties at $1,000.00.

The husband received the

tools, but he will have to make his peace with his son, who
claims ownership of some of these tools.
To continue that trial to divide thousands of personal items
would run the attorneys' fees, when combined, to over $2 00.00
per hour, and cost to the State of Utah even more.

The Court

was impressed that Mr. Russell, the defense attorney, was able
to maintain his sense of humor and persuade the defendant to try
to reach an equal division by alternate choosing was the best
possible plan.
The

plaintiff's

attorney,

Sharon

A.

Donovan,

appeared

initially to accept the inevitability of an alternate choice
system, but seemed to be having trouble with her secretary and
her client.

An example would be the immediate dispute over how

the cans of spaghetti and other groceries would be divided.
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It may become necessary to appoint a master to divide the
personal items, but this does not justify the granting of a
complete new trial and going back to square one.
been a terrible ordeal for the parties.
only

serve

the

purpose

of

delaying

the

This trial has

To continue it would
acceptance

decisions unpopular with either or both parties.

of

some

There is no

real contest on the divorce, child custody, and some type of
equal division.

In event of a re-trial the Court can see no way

that either party would gain enough to offset the additional
attorneys fees.
The Motion for a New Trial is denied.
DATED this

;

7

day
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the

foregoing

following, this

Memorandum
ffl

Decision,

postage

prepaid,

to

the

day of May, 1992:

Sharon A. Donovan
Shannon W. Clark
Attorneys for Plaintiff
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101
William R. Russell
Attorney for Defendant
8 East Broadway, Suite 213
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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WARRANTY DEED

'
(/

ROGER W. FINLAYSON, Trustee of the Mina W. Finlayson
Revocable Trust, and MINA W. FINLAYSON, Settlor of the Mina W.
Finlayson Revocable Trust, Grantors, of Salt Lake City, U;ah,
hereby convey and warrant to ROGER W. FINLAYSON and ARVILLA K.
! FINLAYSON, his wife, Grantees, of Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, for the sum of Ten Dollars, and other good and valuable
considerations, the following described tracts of land in Sa3t
Lake County, Utah:
Parcel 1:
Beginning at the Northwest corner of Lot 80, Cottonwood Meadows A, B, and C, amended, and running thence
South 87° 30f East 63.84 feet; thence South 57° 55'
40" East 80.0 feet; thence South 48° 45f West 66.48
feet; thence South 35° 07! 59" East 13.54 feet;
thence South 51° West 27.70 feet; thence North 57°
55' 40" West 116.42 feet; thence North 29° 15' East
63.92 feet to the point of beginning.
Parcel 2:
Beginning at the Northeast corner of Lot 82, Cottonwood Meadows A, B, and C, amended, a subdivision
located in the West Half of Section 9, Township 2
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian;
and running thence North 35° 07' 59" West 13.54
feet; thence North 48° 45* East 66.48 feel.; thence
South 57° 55* 40" East 14.05 feet; thence South
48° 45 * West 71.96 feet to point of beginning.
Parcel 3:
Beginning at the most Northerly point of Lot 80,
Cottonwood Meadows A, B, and C, amended, Subdivision,
and running thence South 87° 30' East 63.84 feet to
Highland Circle; thence North 57° 55' 40" West 57.08
feet along Highland Circle; thence South 29° 15f
West 31.54 feet to point of beginning.
WITNESS the hands of said Grantors, this
, 1978.

*^-'~

day o::

Koge/ W. Finlayson, Trustee of the
Mina W. Finlayson Revocable Trust

.

•->-.•

y

\

:

Mina W. Finlayson, "Settlor of the"
Mina W. Finlayson Revocable Trust
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COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
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, 1978, personally
On the 4 J day of
appeared before me ROGER W. FINLAYSON, Trustee of the Mina W.
Finlayson Revocable Trust, and MINA W. FINLAYSON, Set£loT~o-&<the
n.rN
Mina W. Finlayson Revocable Trust, the signers of
within-.
instrument, who duly acknowledged t o me t h a t they yfe^piuttiepl t h e \ ,
same.
tAli/i
\Notary
nlwfft
Public

ssiding a t S a l t Lake Ci\

***;

+-9f

My Commission expires:

\\-w-nn

K3
LAW erriet• OF
MOFFAT. WCLUNO * PAULMWH
A rnort••IOMAU CORPORATION
OTH FLOOR rniUUHt »UILOfNO
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ROGER W. FINLAYSON, Trustee of the Mina W. Finlayson
i Revocable Trust, and MINA W. FINLAYSON, Settlor of the Mina W.
j Finlayson Revocable Trust, Grantors, of Salt Lake City, U ;ah,
' hereby convey and warrant to ROGER W. FINLAYSON and ARVILLA K.
FINLAYSON, his wife, Grantees, of Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, for the sum of Ten Dollars, and other good and valuable
considerations, the following described tracts of land in Salt
| Lake County, Utah:
Parcel 1:
Beginning at the Northwest corner of Lot 80, Cottonwood Meadows A, B, and C, amended, and running thence
South 87° 30' East 63.84 feet; thence South 57° 55'
40" East 80.0 feet; thence South 48° 451 West 66.48
feet; thence South 35° 07' 59w East 13.54 feet;
thence South 51° West 27.70 feet; thence North 57°
55' 40" West 116.42 feet; thence North 29° 15* East
63.92 feet to the point of beginning.
Parcel 2:
Beginning at the Northeast corner of Lot 82, Cottonwood Meadows A, B, and C, amended, a subdivision
located in the West Half of Section 9, Township 2
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base ctnd Meridian;
and running thence North 35° 071 59" West 13.54
feet; thence North 48° 45* East 66.48 feet.; thence
South 57° 55" 40" East 14.05 feet; thence South
48° 45* West 71.96 feet to point of beginning.

I

Parcel 3:
Beginning at the most Northerly point of Lot 80,
Cottonwood Meadows A, B, and C, amended, Subdivision,
and running thence South 87° 30! East 63.84 feet to
Highland Circle; thence North 57° 55' 40" West 57.08
feet along Highland Circle; thence South 29° 15!
West 31.54 feet to point of beginning.

I
|
|

WITNESS the hands of said Grantors, this
, 1978.

•<?

^--

day o:f

.
'
°

Roger1 W. Finlayson, Trustee of the
Mina W. Finlayson Revocable Trust
^

•••>:

y

\

-

w

Mina W. Finlayson, Settlor of the "
Mina W. Finlayson Revocable Trust
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COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

On the 4'^ day of /H'n'^ /
, 1978, personally
appeared before me ROGER W. FINLAYSON, Trustee of the Mina W.
Finlayson Revocable Trust, and MINA W. FINLAYSOtf, Set^fcloT-crK^he
Mina W. Finlayson Revocable Trust, the signers of th^^wvithin-. J^N
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that theyy%^^£eS the'--,. \
same.

|!

UHW'4 t\M^AyxA

Notary Public
ssiding a t S a l t Lake C&&<2/tffcah

\^\

My Commission expires:

*\5
LAW orrtct • or
<•

fi

MOFFAT. W C L L I N O * P A U L * ™
A monitioNAL CORPORATION

^jJ

OTH FLOOR TRIBUNI BUILOINQ

^*

A « 7 0 4 3 SOUTH MA,N ' T * c r f

^ ^ S V U T L A K E CITY. U T A H 8 4 1 1 1

i

STATEMENT OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
Finlavson v. Finlayson
Arvilla
House and real property at
4950 Highland Circle including
adjacent vacant l o t —
to be sold and net proceeds
divided equally after adjustment
for property settlement as
provided below

1/2

Roger

1/2

Automobiles:
1987 Honda Accord
(NADA Average trade-in)

6,300

1987 Jeep Wagoneer
(NADA Average trade-in)

9,425

1975 Dodge Van
(NADA Average trade-in)

1,175

1978 Pace Arrow Motorhome

12,000

(per appraisal)
1980 Dune Buggy

1,000

Motorcycles:
1978 Honda 750cc

300

1985 Honda 700cc

1,900

1984 Honda 250cc

900

1968 Honda 90cc (2)

50

50

(Plaintiff requests one)
1980 Honda 80cc

200

1978 Honda 75cc

50

23 ' Gulfstream boat

3,000

90 shs. Pacific Corp. @24.25
$2,182.50

2,182

A-80

Commonwealth Equity Trust USA
Value $9,800

9,800

Putnam Fund $2,600

2,600

Cash removed by defendant from
Zion's Bank account prior to
parties1 division of account:
9/11/90

$9,300

9/12/90

9,000

18,300

Life USA Policy (Roger) $30,000
Life USA Policy (Arvilla)

1/2

1/2

1,000

Camper World membership

6,000

Coin collection
(Plaintiff estimates values
$15,000-30,000)

1/2

1/2

Gun collection

15,500

Power and hand tools

10,000

"Precious moment11 doll collection

1,000

Personal property—furniture,
furnishings, etc.
Commercial First Thrift

1/2

1/2

proceeds divided equally

1/2

1/2

VauLt $1,435 new

1,200

Fireplace insert $1,149

600

Utility trailer

900

Cement mixer $750 new

375

Riding lawn mower $1,500 new;
one year old
Riding lawn mower, 18 yrs old,
rebuilt engine, working condition
Motors—extensive collection of
various types motors

A-81

1,000
400
?

Power edger $3 50 new

175

Mulcher $830 new

400

Snowblower $850 new

400

Canoe, metal, 23 yrs old.
(Plaintiff requests)

300
$23,232

TOTAL VALUES
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT to plaintiff
to equalize values to be paid
from first proceeds of sale of
home and/or lot; remaining
sales proceeds to be divided
between parties
NET DISTRIBUTION

31,009
$54,241

A-82

$85,250

(31,009)
$54,241

SUMMARY OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS
ARVILLA FINLAYSON

Attorney's fees
Sharon A. Donovan, 25.6 hrs. @$100
Shannon W. Clark, 34.35 hrs. @$75
Kent M. Kasting, .3 hrs. @$125
Clerk/paralegal, 30.25 hrs. @$50
TOTAL FEES
Costs
Filing/recording fees
Service fees
Deposition costs
Copies/hand-deliveries
TOTAL COSTS (excluding trial)
TOTAL ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

UNNECESSARY FEES INCURRED DUE TO DEFENDANT'S
LACK OF COOPERATION AND CONTEMPT OF COURT ORDERS
AND PURSUIT OF FRIVOLOUS CLAIM
(see highlighted charges on statements attached)

A-83

REVIEW STATEMENT
FOR
INTERNAL USE ONLY

TO-BE-BILLED
DATE

Arvilla Finlayson
*Bo^to^s£n^fed-4iGme:*
ACC'T NO.

PREVIOUS RETAINER BALANCE
1-30 Days: 31-60 Days: 61-90 Days:
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
PRIOR ACCOUNT HISTORY:
Prior Charges: Prior Service:
.
$60.00
$80.00
Prior Hours:
Prior Int.:
0.80
$0.00
DATE

01-25-91

1-SADFINL/ARV-1C

$2,000.00
Over 90:
$0.00

Past Due:
$0.00

Prior Expense: Prior Payment:
$60.00
$0.00
Prior
Cr.Adj.:
Prior Tax:
$20.00
$0.00
TIME

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED
(SEE ATTACHED LIST)

TOTAL FOR THE ABOVE SERVICES
DATE

10.95

$851.25

EXPENSES
(SEE ATTACHED LIST)
$92.90

TOTAL FOR THE ABOVE EXPENSES
TOTAL
PAYMENT RECEIVED
TOTAL PAYMENTS
RETAINER BALANCE

REVIEW STATEMENT
3RNAL^U£
INTEI
JSE ONLY

$1,055.85 (
$0.00
$1,055.85 C

PAGE 2
TO-BE-BILLED
DATE

Arvilla Finlayson
*Do not send to home*
ACC'T NO.

ME

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED

2-14-90 CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT RE: WITHDRAWAL OF
MONEY.
2-19-90 CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT; DRAFT SUMMONS,
COMPLAINT; BEGIN PREPARATION MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER.
2-19-90 CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT.
2-20-90 COMPLETE MOTION FOR RESTRAINING ORDER
AND OTHER TEMPORARY ISSUES; MEETING WITH
ARVILLA; OPEN TRUST ACCOUNT; REVIEW
VERIFIED COMPLAINT AND MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; CONFERENCE
WITH SHARON DONOVAN TO DETERMINE SUPPORT
AMOUNTS; TO COURT TO HAVE FILED - SIGNED
BY JUDGE AND ISSUED.
-20-90 CONFERENCE WITH SHANNON CLARK.
-27-90 PHONE CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT; PREPARE
FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE HEARING; ATTEND
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE HEARING TO READ
STIPULATION INTO RECORD.
>-27-90 CONFERENCE WITH SHANNON CLARK.
2-28-90 PHONE CONFERENCE WITH ARVILLA RE:
TRISHA'S WHEREABOUTS; REVIEW ORDER
SUBMITTED BY BILL RUSSELL.
!-31-90 PHONE CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT RE: WEEKEND
AND TRISHA'S WHEREABOUTS; ATTEMPTS TO
PHONE BILL RUSSELL RE: SAME; LETTER TO
RUSSELL RE: SAME.
.TE

EXPENSES

-2 0-90
-20-90
-20-90
-21-90

FILING FEE
Copies
Copies
Copies

1-SADFINL/ARV-1C

INDIV

TIME

SAD

0.30

$30.00

SWC
SAD

2.25
0.30

$168.75
$30.00

SWC
SAD

4.50
0.30

$337.50
$30.00

SWC
SAD

2.25
0.30

$168.75
$30.00

SWC

0.25

$18.75

SWC

0.50

$37.50

$82.00
$2.80
$7.90
$0.20
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED RECAP

TIMEKEEPER
SAD

EFFECTIVE RATE

TIME

CHARGE

$100.00

1.20

$120.00

A-85

01-25-91

PAGE 3
TO-BE-BILLED
Arvilla Finlayson
*Do not send to home*

DATE
ACC'T NO.

1-SADFINL/ARV-1C

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED RECAP
TIMEKEEPER

EFFECTIVE RATE

TIME

CHARGE

SWC

$75.00

9.75

$731.25

TOTAL

$77.74

10.95

$851.25

A-86

01-25-91

REVIEW STATEMENT
FOR
INTERNAL USE ONLY

TO-BE-BILLED
Arvilla Finlayson
4950 Highland Circle
Salt Lake City, Utah

DATE
ACC'T NO.

84117

EVIOUS RETAINER BALANCE
-30 Days: 31-60 Days: 61-90 Days:
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
COR ACCOUNT HISTORY:
Lor Charges: Prior Service:
$1,938.05
$1,816.25
Prior Int.:
Prior Hours:
$0.00
23.25
PE

03-22-91

1-SADFINL/ARV-1C

$121.95 C

Over 90:
$0.00

Prior Expense:
$141.80
Prior Tax:
$0.00

Past Due:
$0.00

Prior Payment:
$60.00
Prior Cr.Adj.:

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED

$20.00
TIME

(SEE ATTACHED LIST)
9.60

PAL FOR THE ABOVE SERVICES
?E

$735.00

EXPENSES

• 0 5 - 9 1 COPIES
• 1 1 - 9 1 COPIES

$0.60
$1.10

'AL FOR THE ABOVE EXPENSES

$1.70

TOTAL
TOTAL PAYMENTS

$0.00
AMOUNT DUE

REVIEW STATEMENT

F&R87
INTERNAL USE ONLY

$614.75

$614.75

PAGE 2
TO-BE-BILLED
Arvilla Finlayson
4950 Highland Circle
Salt Lake City, Utah

VTE

DATE
1

84117

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED

2-01- 91 INVENTORY AT CLIENT HOME.
2-04- 91 PHONE CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT RE:
PROPERTY AND MOVE; LETTER TO RUSSELL RE:
SAME AND FOLLOW UP TO INVENTORY.
-91
LETTER
TO CLIENT RE: PROPERTY LIST FROM
2-07
MR. FINLAYSEN AND ACCOUNTING.
2-12 -91 CONFERENCE WITH SHARON DONOVAN; PHONE
CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT; LETTER TO BILL
RUSSELL RE: CUSTODY EVALUATION AND
REALTOR.
2-12 -91 CONFERENCE WITH SHANNON CLARK RE:
CUSTODY EVALUATION.
>-19 -91 PHONE CONFERENCE WITH BILL RUSSELL RE:
AGREEMENT ON EVALUATOR AND STATUS OF
REALTOR; CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT RE:
DISCOVERY, CUSTODY EVALUATOR, REALTOR,
VISITATION AND APPRAISAL; LETTER TO
RUSSELL RE: SAME.
>-26-91 CONFERENCE WITH SHARON DONOVAN RE:
STRATEGY FOR DISCOVERY, SELLING OF
HOUSE AND GETTING EVALUATION STARTED.
1-26-91 CONFERENCE WITH SHANNON CLARK RE: STATUS
OF CASE.
1-27-91 PHONE CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT RE:
REALTOR, APPRAISOR AND VISITATION WITH
TRISHA OVER WEEKEND.
1-27-91 DICTATE INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS.
'-28-91 PHONE CONFERENCE WITH RUSSELL RE:
REALTOR; PHONE CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT
CONFIRMING EAGER; CONFIRM WITH RUSSELL;
LETTER TO RUSSELL RE: TAXES AND
COOPERATION IN FILING.

NO.

1-SADFINL/ARV-1C

INDIV

TIME

SWC

2.75

$206.25

SWC

0.40

$30.00

SWC

0.20

$15.00

SWC

0.75

$56.25

SAD

0.30

$30.00

SWC

1.40

$105.00

SWC

0.50

$37.50

SAD

0.30

$30.00

SWC

0.25

$18.75

SWC

2.25

$168.75

SWC

0.50

$37.50

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED RECAP
TIMEKEEPER
SAD
SWC
TOTAL

EFFECTIVE RATE

TIME

CHARGE

$100.00
$75.00

0.60
9.00

$60.00
$675.00

$76.56

9.60

$735.00

A-88

03-22-91

REVIEW STATEMENT
FOR
INTERNAL USE ONLY

TO-BE-BILLED
Arvilla Finlayson
4950 Highland Circle
Salt Lake City, Utah

DATE
ACC'T NO.

84117

PREVIOUS RETAINER BALANCE
1-30 Days: 31-60 Days: 61-90 Days:
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
PRIOR ACCOUNT HISTORY:
"-ior Charges: Prior Service:
J $1,004.15.
$931.25
Prior Hours:
Prior Int.:
11.75
$0.00
DATE

02-15-91

1-SADFINL/ARV-1C

$1,055.85 C
Over 90:
$0.00

Prior Expense:
$92.90
Prior Tax:
$0.00

Past Due:
$0.00

Prior Payment:
$60.00
Prior Cr.Adj.:
$20.00

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED

TIME

(SEE ATTACHED LIST)
TOTAL FOR THE ABOVE SERVICES
DATE

11.50

$885.00

EXPENSES
(SEE ATTACHED LIST)

TOTAL FOR THE ABOVE EXPENSES

$48.90
TOTAL
TOTAL PAYMENTS
RETAINER BALANCE

REVIEWSTATEMENT
INTERNAL USE ONLY

$121.95 C
$0.00
$121.95 C

PAG
TO-BE-BILLED
Arvilla Finlayson
4950 Highland Circle
Salt Lake City, Utah

DATE

DATE
ACC'T NO.

84117

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED

01-02-91 PHONE CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT RE:
COUNSELING FOR TRISHA; DEBT FROM KURT;
PHONE CONFERENCE WITH BILL RUSSEL RE:
WHERE TRISHA WILL BE STAYING.
01-04- 91 PHONE CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT RE:
TRISHA'S WHEREABOUTS; BRIEFLY REVIEW
DOCUMENTS FROM BILL RUSSEL; SEND TO
CLIENT.
01-07- 91 PHONE CONFERENCE WITH BILL RUSSEL AND
CLIENT RE: TRISHA'S WHEREABOUTS AND
KEEPING CLIENT INFORMED.
01-08- 91 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT TO
FORMULATE RESPONSES TO AFFIDAVIT;
DICTATE RESPONSE AFFIDAVIT.
S?£JS*.09-91 REVIEW AFFIDAVIT.
ox-10- 91 MEET WITH CLIENT TO FINALIZE AFFIDAVIT;
REVIEW AND ADD LETTER FROM DOROTHY
EVANS; PREPARE FOR HEARING.
01-11- 91 ATTEND AND ARGUE HEARING ON TEMPORARY
MATTERS, INCLUDING CUSTODY AND
POSSESSION OF THE MARITAL RESIDENCE.
01-14- 91 CONFERENCE WITH SHANNON CLARK RE:
CUSTODY EVALUATION AND SELECTION OF
LISTING AGENT FOR SALE OF MARITAL
RESIDENCE.
01-14- 91 PHONE CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT RE: FOLLOW
UP QUESTIONS AFTER THE HEARING.
01-15- 91 TWO PHONE CONFERENCES WITH PUELER'S
CLERK R E : INTERVIEW TRISHA AND LORI;
PHONE CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT RE: SAME.
01-18- 91 PHONE CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT RE: BREAK
IN; PHONE CONFERENCE WITH BILL RUSSEL;
LETTER R E : SAME.
01-24- 91 REVIEW RECOMMENDATION; PHONE CONFERENCE
WITH CLIENT; LETTER TO CLIENT RE: SAME;
PHONE CONFERENCE WITH BILL RUSSEL RE:
INVENTORY AND RECOMMENDATION; PHONE
CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT R E : SAME.
01-24-91 CONFERENCE WITH SHANNON CLARK RE:
DECISION.
-25-91 PHONE CONFERENCE WITH BILL RUSSEL RE:
FEBRURARY INVENTORY; PHONE CONFERENCE

A-90

02-15

1-SADFINL/ARV

INDIV

TIME

SWC

0.25

$18

SWC

0.25

$18

SWC

0.25

$18

SWC

swc

2.20
0.25

$165
$18

swc

2.25

$168

swc

1.25

$93

KMK

0.30

$37

swc

0.25

$18

swc

0.60

$45

SWC

0.75

$56

SWC

1.30

$97

SAD

0.30

$30

PAGE 3
TO-BE-BILLED
Arvilla Finlayson
4950 Highland Circle
Salt Lake City, Utah

^TE

DATE
ACC'T NO.

84117

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED

WITH CLIENT RE: SAME.
L-29-91 REVIEW STIPULATION AND COMMISSIONER'S
RECOMMENDATION; CALL BILL RUSSEL RE: 1
SAME; PHONE CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT RE:•
SAME.
L-30-91 PHONE CONFERENCE RE: INVENTORY.
^TE

EXPENSES

.-04-91
.-04-91
.-04-91
.-04-91
-07-91
.-10-91
.-18-91
.-31-91

SERVICE FEE - SUMMONS & COMPLAINT
COPIES
SERVICE FEE - TRO & ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
HAND DELIVERY
COPIES
COPIES
COPIES
COPIES

1-SADFINL/ARV-1C

INDIV

TIME

SWC

0.25

$18.75

SWC
SWC

0.75
0.30

$56.25
$22.50

$3.75
$1.10
$21.75
$7.50
$1.00
$11.70
$1.20
$0.90

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED RECAP
TIMEKEEPER
KMK
SAD
SWC
TOTAL

EFFECTIVE RATE

TIME

CHARGE

$125.00
$100.00
$75.00

0.30
0.30
10.90

$37.50
$30.00
$817.50

$76.96

11.50

$885.00

A-91

02-15-91

'.Jv.,,'

SHARON A. DONOVAN (0901)
SHANNON W. CLARK (5678)
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
310 South Main Street, Suite 13 3 0
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2167
Telephone: (801) 521-6383

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oOo
ARVILLA FINLAYSON,

PLAINTIFF'S AFFIDAVIT IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR FINDING
IN RE: CONTEMPT, FOR ORDER
COMPELLING COMPLIANCE WITH COURT
ORDERS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES

Plaintiff,
V.

ROGER FINLAYSON,

Civil NO. D90-5062

Defendant.

Honorable Timothy R. Hansen
•oOo-

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

ss,

COMES NOW the plaintiff, Arvilla Finlayson, after being
first duly sworn upon oath, and deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am the plaintiff in the above-entitled matter.

2.

I have personal knowledge concerning the facts and

circumstances surrounding the matters set forth below.
3.

I am the ex-wife of Roger Finlayson.

Our divorce

was tried before the above-entitled Court on October 17 and 18,

A92

0017

1991.

At that time, defendant and I stipulated to a number of

matters, and the Court ruled on the remainder of the issues
relating to the divorce.
4.

In March of 1991, over a year ago, defendant and I

stipulated that the marital residence should be immediately listed
for sale. In addition, as a result of the divorce trial, the Court
ordered that the marital residence be sold as soon as possible.
Both before and after the divorce trial, defendant has been
uncooperative with the then listing agent of Eager & Company.
Accordingly, I have been speaking with different realtors and have
signed a listing agreement with Miller & Company.

Defendant has

not been willing to cooperate in signing the listing agreement or
in even speaking with the realtor on the telephone, in order to
make the necessary arrangements to enter into the listing agreement
and eventually show the home to potential buyers.
5.

The agent I have listed with is Mr. Rudy Valley. He

has informed me that he has made 10 to 15 attempts to contact
defendant in person or by phone to get him to sign the listing
agreement.

On numerous occasions, he has been told by the minor

child in defendant's custody that defendant is unavailable or not
at home.
6.

At the divorce trial, the Court ordered defendant to

make necessary repairs on the home to facilitate its sale.

I

believe that the defendant has not made the necessary repairs and,
in fact, holes still remain in the kitchen floor.

2

A-93
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7.

The marital residence is the primary asset of the

marital estate and I am in dire need of the proceeds from the sale.
Nonetheless, over a year after the original Order to sell the home,
defendant continues to refuse make the necessary repairs to the
home or to even enter into a listing agreement•
8.

Pursuant to the Order of the Court, defendant and I

were each awarded a vehicle.

However, the defendant refuses to

transfer to the me the title to my Honda and also the motor home I
was awarded.
9.

I have made the above requests of defendant numerous

times, and my attorney has also made these requests through
defendant's attorney with no response.

See letter attached as

Exhibit "A".
10.

Although

defendant

has

been

residing

in

the

mortgage-free marital residence for approximately one year, he
refuses to be responsible for the property taxes that have accrued
over this period of time.

I have been forced to reside in various

apartments and have paid the rents associated therewith with no
assistance from defendant.

It is reasonable and proper that

defendant be ordered to immediately pay all property tax on the
marital residence which became due in November of 1991.
11.

Defendant had

membership during 1991.

possession

of the Camperworld

There is an annual fee associated with

this membership of approximately $200.00 per year.
the camperworld membership at trial.

I was awarded

I would like to be able to

sell the membership, however, defendant has not paid the 1991 fee
3
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and therefore I am unable to sell it until that is done.

It is

fair and reasonable to require defendant to pay the membership fee
for the time period he had possession and transfer it to me so I
may sell it.
12.

Pursuant to the Order of the Court, defendant and I

were ordered to select a family counselor to work with our minor
child in counseling sessions.

We were ordered to cooperate,

schedule the sessions and each ordered to pay one-half.

In a

letter to defendant's counsel dated February 10, 1992, (attached)
I suggested two names as counselors for Tricia.

Since that time,

I have received no response from defendant regarding commencement
of these counseling sessions, and it is fair and proper for the
Court to order defendant to cooperate in all respects in beginning
Tricia1s counseling sessions as soon as possible.
13.

Pursuant to a stipulation, we agreed to divide the

marital personal property by going from room to room in the marital
residence and alternating selections.

This has been a very time-

consuming project. For the first several sessions, both defendant
and I had our attorneys present to facilitate the arrangement.
Since then, however, defendant and I have attempted to divide the
personal property on our own.

I have had a very difficult time

reaching an agreement with the defendant on times that we could
both meet at the home and complete the division of the personal
property.

It

is my

belief

that

defendant

is purposefully

sabotaging the division of property by not allowing me to come back
in the home, by not returning my telephone calls, by not answering
4

A-95

the telephone and by refusing to allow me into the house even at
time that have been previously agreed upon by defendant and myself
and our counsel.
14.

As an example of the difficultly I have had in

dividing the personal property, I was awarded the 9 drawer dresser
we had in our bedroom.

All drawers were present until I made

arrangements to take it out of the home at which time one drawer
disappeared.

Defendant claims he has no knowledge of the missing

drawers whereabouts.

In addition, defendant and I and both our

attorneys inventoried the contents of the home in Winter 1991.
Extensive lists of all the personal property were created.

Since

that time numerous items on the inventory are missing and defendant
claims to have no information about their whereabouts. An example
of the missing items is as follows: numerous brand new plush toys,
camping supplies, chain saw, record player, family photographs and
numerous

other

items.

It is my belief that defendant

is

purposefully hiding this property from me.
15.

I ask the Court to order defendant to participate in

the completion of the division of personal property by specifically
ordering defendant to cooperate in setting up several times that
are mutually convenient when I may go into the marital residence
and work with defendant in dividing property. It would be fair and
proper for the order to require defendant to continue to cooperate
until such time as both he and I are satisfied that all personal
property in the marital residence has been divided.

5
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16.

Defendant and I were ordered to divide the stock

acquired during the marriage equally.

I have had the investment

company send the documents necessary for division of the stock
certificates directly to defendant.

Defendant has refused to

execute such agreements, and it is fair and proper that the Court
order him to do so.
17.

Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce, I was awarded the

marital motor home.
residence.

The motor home was stored at the marital

It was inside a locked fence. The vehicle and the gas

tanks itself were locked, and only defendant had access to the
keys.

Shortly after the divorce trial, I went to the marital

residence to pick up the motor home, at which time I discovered
that sugar had been put into the motor home's gas tanks.

Sugar

crystals could be seen around the opening of the tank, and the
sugar itself could be tasted and smelled.

It is my belief that

defendant is responsible for sabotaging the vehicle, and it would
be fair and equitable for the Court to order him to make such
repairs as would be necessary to put the vehicle in good working
order so I may remove it from the residence and do with it what I
would like.
18.

I have had to bring this Motion to address the

numerous Orders of the Court with which defendant refused to
comply.

As outlined above, defendant has engaged in a pattern of

consistent refusal to obey Court Orders both before and after the
Divorce was finalized.

Further, I was awarded the nominal amount

of $500.00 in attorney's fees at trial. As a result of defendant's
6

AO7
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action and inaction, I have incurred attorney's fees and costs in
bringing this Motion, and it would be fair and reasonable to Order
him to pay iay fees and costs in the amount of $1,000.00.
DATED this 2/b

day of March, 1992.

LMf?l/J&i 7 <-h~tJuU,^ur
ARVILLA FlfltAYSON

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, the undersigned Notary
Public, this /^p?^day of March, 1992.

IjjjvMJtrwQculgNOTARY PUBLIC
[SEAL]
1

— ^ ^

Notary Put:',
IRENE M. CLARK
1
310 South Mnin St. #130 |

State of Utah
,
—
™ ——

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

srixday

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that on the ^ ( Q
of

March,

1992, a

true

and

correct

copy

of

the

foregoing

Plaintiff's Affidavit in Support of Motion for Finding in Re:
Contempt and for Order Compelling Compliance with Court Orders was
mailed, postage prepaid, to:
William R. Russell, Esq.
8 East Broadway, Suite 213
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

• n/Yxi)fYYflg;di)f
IRENE M. CLARK

A-98
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

T

above

hereby certify that foi ir true and correct copies r.
and

foregoing

BRIEF

OF

APPELLANT

-.iu !y

addressed to:
William R. Russell, Esq.
8 East Broadway, Suit e 213
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
DATED this

%_ _ _ day of December, 1992

K _ \ ^ <x.-/^-A--'V ^-A.

hand

MP

delivered,,

